The complexity of coordination in Zimbabwe’s power sharing government (2009-2013) : the case of green fuel and restructuring of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company by Nyakabawu, Shingirai
The Complexity of Coordination in Zimbabwe’s Power 
Sharing Government (2009-2013): The Case of Green Fuel 
and Restructuring of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company  
 
Shingirai Nyakabawu 
3079301 
Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Degree 
Masters in Public Administration at the School of 
Government, University of the Western Cape 2015 
Supervisor Professor John J Williams 
 
 
 
 
i 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Declaration 
1. I know that plagiarism is wrong. Plagiarism is to use another’s work and pretend that 
it is one’s own. 
2. I have used the ………Harvard…….. convention for citation and referencing. Each 
contribution to, and quotation in, this project from the work(s) of other people has 
been attributed, and has been cited and referenced. 
3. This project is my own work. 
4. I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my work with the intention of 
passing it off as his or her own work.  
Signature ______________________________ 
 
    
Thesis due 
date 
May  2015 
Submitted May 2015 
Received by  
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Abstract 
This study examines the challenges of coordination in Zimbabwe’s power sharing 
government (2009 to 2013) between ZANU PF and the two MDC formations in the 
implementation of policies that cross ministerial jurisdictions under ministers from different 
political parties. The analysis was done through the theoretical lens of Shepsle and Laver 
(1996) that a cabinet minister as the political head of a major government department have 
the formal discretion of any policy issues under his jurisdiction and uses his or her own 
power to influence the substance of any specific proposals that matters within his or her own 
jurisdiction. I empirically examined the restructuring of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel 
Company and the Green Fuel Project where the outcome of the projects required joint 
working between ministries controlled by different political parties. Green Fuel is a large 
scale ethanol producing factory constructed at a cost of US$600 million as a partnership 
between the Ministry of Agriculture and a private investor, but for the blended fuel to be 
consumed as an end product needed collaboration from the Ministry of Power and Energy 
Development to put out legislation enforcing mandatory blending. The Minister of Energy 
and Power Development ruled out mandatory blending of petrol and ethanol that left the 
US$600 million Green Fuels ethanol projector ground its operations and imperilled 5000 
direct jobs the company had created arguing that the government does not make public policy 
for individuals and that the project was started without the consultation of the MDC.  He also 
argued that the bio ethanol project affected communities in various ways including 
dispossession of their land, the slashing of their crops, killing of their cattle and the 
dispossession from their land. The restructuring of ZISCO entailed the partial sale of the 
government owned entity spearheaded by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. It went 
through a bidding process and 54% of shares were transferred from the state to EAHL and it 
was renamed New Zim Steel at a ceremony presided over by the head of state. Critical to 
ZISCO resuming operations was the transfer of mineral rights and the Minister of Mines 
Obert Mpofu refused to do so arguing that he did not know about the ZISCO deal, was 
excluded from the negotiation process of the agreement deal despite that the agreement was 
concluded by cabinet. In both instances, policies that emanated from a ministry controlled by 
a minister of another political party did not achieve their horizontal objectives.  
 Key words: coordination, power sharing, ZANU PF, MDC, jurisdiction, ministerial 
discretion, ZISCO, Green Fuel, minister,
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1.1 Introduction   
Power sharing has become a popular doctrine of managing conflict in various African 
countries (Cheeseman, 2011; Tull & Mehler, 2005; Spears, 2000, Spears, 2002; Mehler, 
2009; Mapuva 2010; Levan 2011; Grove, 2011). The years from 1999 to the year 2009 
witnessed power sharing governments in Africa in countries such as Mali, Ivory Coast, 
Sudan, Chad, Angola, Kenya, and Zimbabwe (Mehler, 2009). While most power sharing 
governments in Africa had been used mainly as a device of ending civil wars between 
warring ethnic groups, from 2007 a new wave of power sharing governments emerged as 
incumbent power hungry presidents resorted to post election violence to fight their way back 
to the negotiating table after electoral defeat as was the case with Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and 
Kenya.  
A power sharing government involves “the construction of a more or less inclusive 
government that represents the broad range of concerned parties and may include provisions 
regarding the distribution of bureaucratic posts and the new rules for the makeup” 
(Cheeseman and Mtendi, 2010:203).  A substantial body of literature on power sharing 
governments focus on the costs of sharing power and arguments in literature mainly range 
from those that are sceptical to those that are critical, others are supportive while others 
passionately defend power-sharing governments in terms of their formation, mediation, 
termination, and disagreements in implementation of power sharing pacts (Tridmas, 2011; 
Cheeseman, 2011; Tull & Mehler, 2005; Spears, 2000, Spears, 2002; Mehler, 2009; Mapuva 
2010; Levan 2011; Grove, 2011; Bratton, 2011;   LeVan, & Assenov, 2009, Cheeseman and 
Mtendi, 2010).   
This study contributes to the growing body of literature on power sharing governments in 
Africa by analysing the challenges of coordination in the implementation of policies that 
cross ministerial jurisdictions under ministers from different political parties in Zimbabwe’s 
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power sharing government between the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front 
(ZANU PF) and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T and MDC-M) 
formations in the period 2009 to 2013. Ministerial portfolio authority over a bundle of policy 
dimensions is referred to as ministerial jurisdiction (Laver and Shepsle, 1996:240).  For 
instance, the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence is usually stated in the constitution as 
involving defending and safeguarding the country against domestic and external threats.  
Cross cutting program is used to refer to a program whose success was dependent on joint 
working between government ministries that were controlled by ministers from different 
political parties; that is ZANU PF and MDC-T/M. Implementation is “the ability to achieve 
the predicted consequences of a policy or program” (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973: xiv). A 
policy is said to have not been implemented when the predicted consequences were not 
realised. Thus programs are called coordinated based upon the extent to which they achieve a 
specified end state. According to Bakvis and Juilet (2004:8), coordination is “the 
management of two or more departments within the state where the units in question do not 
have hierarchical control over each other and where the aim is to generate outcomes that are 
not achievable with departments working in isolation with each other so that horizontal 
objectives are not achieved with the action of another department”.  
This study posits that a power sharing government inhibits coordination through the 
distribution of ministries to competing political parties which result in obstructions in the 
implementation of policies that cross ministerial portfolios controlled by ministers from 
different political parties. This should not be taken as an overstatement that coordination 
problems do not arise in cabinets from one political party, but they are likely to be without 
the political rivalry that characterizes a power sharing government. This thesis focuses 
mainly on the interaction between ministers and their direct bearing on policy outcomes as it 
is these people in the upper echelons of government who provide policy proposals, assist in 
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policy formulation of programs and engage in the management and translation of policy 
hopes into realities. The cabinet minister is also “the loci for the management of cross cutting 
policy issues, it is the person that performs the principal task in policy making and it is person 
who protects the interests of their departments by engaging in turf protection” (Peters, 
1998a:29).  
Taking the concept of ministerial autonomy to the extreme, Laver and Shepsle (1996) 
theorize that cabinet ministers are policy dictators within their jurisdictions, and even though 
cabinet as a collective is responsible for making policy decisions in a government, any 
decision taken by cabinet needs the expertise and cooperation of a certain government 
department to be implemented and it is the cabinet minister who is the political head of a 
major government department who as a person with formal jurisdiction of that department is 
clearly in the driver’s seat in relation to any policy areas under his/her jurisdiction. Based on 
the preceding research problematic, my thesis posits that a minister and the Cabinet can have 
divergent views on a program and a program is more likely to reach its intended end if the 
cabinet minister who controls the corresponding ministerial portfolio is in agreement with the 
position taken by cabinet.  
Given that “power is not shared, but is divided and power sharing partners exercise power 
differently within exclusive and competing zones of authority” (Bratton and Masunungure, 
2011:34), I furthermore argue that whenever parties join together to form a government, 
“there will be areas of substantial policy disagreements” and the lack of coordination is 
caused by “differential preferences” and trying to bring a certain outcome when cabinet 
ministers from different political parties are not in agreement over the particular form of 
action taken.  
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1.2 Research Problem  
Zimbabwe’s power sharing government divided ministries between ZANU PF, MDC-T and 
MDC-M. This created unanticipated consequences as a minister vetoed policies that 
emanated from a colleague ministry controlled by a minister from another political party. I 
analyze this problem of distributing cabinet posts to different political parties by focusing on 
Green Fuel and restructuring of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) in the 
period 2009 -2013 when Zimbabwe was ruled by a power sharing government. The outcomes 
of these programs were not achievable by one ministry working alone, but crossed ministerial 
jurisdictions controlled by different political parties.  
Green Fuel is a large scale ethanol producing factory that manufactures anhydrous ethanol 
from sugar cane to supply Zimbabwe and the region (www.greenfuel.co.zw). The project was 
spearheaded by the Ministry of Agriculture which was controlled by ZANU PF through a 
quasi-government parastatal Agricultural Research and Development Authority (ARDA). 
The plant was built at a cost of US$ 600 million with a private investor’s firms Macdom 
Investments and Rating Investments. The main funder of these private firms is Billy 
Rautenbach, a controversial white businessman who was put on the targeted sanctions list in 
2009 by the United States government because he supports Mugabe's ruling regime to engage 
in human rights abuses via his proceeds from mining projects. On the other hand, the MDC 
and its supporters since 2000 elections campaigns were subject to widespread violence, 
murder, attempted murder, torture, rape, disappearances and death threats with most of 
carried by ZANU PF militias, war veterans and some members of the security services 
(Raftopoulos, 2009:215)  
The key issue for Green Fuel success was that for the blended fuel to be consumed as an end 
product, it needed the cooperation of the Minister of Energy and Power Development to put 
out policy or legislation that would enforce fuel suppliers to blend their fuel with ethanol. The 
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Minister of Energy and Power Development Mr Elton Mangoma who was a MDC-T minister 
ruled out mandatory blending of petrol and ethanol that led the US$600 million Green Fuel 
ethanol project to ground its operations and imperilled some 5000 direct jobs the company 
had created.  
The restructuring of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) is also another case. 
ZISCO was formed by the colonial government in the 1940s and by 1990 employed about 
5500 people and indirect employment created by the very existence of ZISCO was around 50 
000 (Kaliyati, 1991). ZISCO played an important role as a foreign currency earner as 80% of 
its products were for export and as generator of employment. From 2000, ZISCO operated 
without a fully constituted board and its blast furnaces were no longer functional while its 
plants and equipment were dilapidated following a decade of no funding (Zhou, 2012:181). 
In 2006, a National Economic Conduct Inspectorate report noted looting of ZISCO steel by 
Mugabe’s vice presidents, ministers and parliamentarians in conjunction with ZISCO 
managing director and marketing executives (Muleya, 2006). In 2010, what was once one of 
Africa's largest integrated steelworks was a mass of antiquated machinery and could hardly 
pay its depleted workforce with a debt of over US$200 million (Muleya, 2006).  
The restructuring of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company entailed the partial sale of the 
state owned steel giant. The restructuring process went through a tender process for almost 
two years with an Indian Company Essar Africa Holdings Limited (EAHL) emerging as a 
winner at a cost of US$750 million. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce which was 
under a MDC-M minister spearheaded the restructuring process and the final deal saw 
President Mugabe presiding over the handover ceremony in August 2011. The predicted 
consequence was that ZISCO would resume its operations. However, ZISCO failed to resume 
operations as the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development which was under a ZANU PF 
minister refused to transfer mineral rights to EAHL which ZISCO owned which were 
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essential for ZISCO to resume its operations. Workers had not received any wage for more 
than five years, some of them dying from hunger and various illnesses. As it stands, ZISCO 
may resume operations in 2016. 
1.3 Research Question 
What challenges of coordination were experienced in Zimbabwe’s power sharing government 
(2009-2013) on Green Fuel and the restructuring of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company 
(ZISCO) and the effects to the community and workers respectively?  
The sub questions are  
Why did the Minister of Energy refuse to grant mandatory blending of ethanol which led 
Green Fuel to stop producing ethanol and send its workers home? 
Why did the Minister of Mines refuse to transfer mineral rights to EAHL which made ZISCO 
to fail to resume operations? 
1.4 Aims of study 
• To analyse the challenges of coordination in Zimbabwe’s power sharing government 
(2009-2013) on Green Fuel and restructuring of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel 
Company.  
• To contribute to literature on power sharing governments 
1.5 Rationale and Significance  of study 
This research seeks to interrogate Halperin et al (2005:13-14)  assertion that the inclusion of 
many parties in the decision making process in a government leads to more moderated and 
nuanced policies resulting from the free flow of information and dissemination of ideas 
discouraging insular thinking and stimulating vigorous debate. Halperin et al (2005) argue 
that the advantage of having more than one party in a government increases the likelihood 
that a broader range of options and concerns will be taken into consideration than would 
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occur in a narrow political structure because the freewheeling of discussion involve people 
continuously engaging in gathering information, making adjustments to their positions, 
allowing for greater versatility timelines and capacity for adjustment in the adoption and 
implementation of policy. This argument is interrogated by analyzing the restructuring of the 
Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO) and the Green Fuel project where the intended 
outcome of these programs or policies needed ministries controlled by different political 
parties to engage each other.  
Peters (1998:295) argues that coordination is “the Holy Grail of public administration as it 
had been the perennial quest of government practitioners since governing structures became 
differentiated into departments and ministries”.  In every country, practicing administrators 
and academic political scientists can be heard bemoaning the failure of coordination as 
policies, programs and laws require departments to at the very least take account of each 
other (Perri 6, 2004: 104). Hood (2005:19) also argues that coordination is one on the first list 
of problems specific to the study of public administration. Since governing structures became 
differentiated into departments, complaints had been there that one department does not know 
what the other is doing, or their programs were contradictory, redundancy or both (Peters, 
1998:295). As a result, scholars on public administration including this author are 
preoccupied with studying coordination for three reasons (Hood, 2005: 19-20). First, 
governments in parliamentary systems require joint decision making from the political 
machinery as government programs can only be achieved through some coordination of some 
kind to move towards a certain end. Second, leadership in an executive government is 
ordinarily understood as meaning capacity to bring together systems and structures and 
thirdly, executive government structures at their summit should have at least some units and 
procedures that are designed to bring the parts together in some way.  
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In addition, studies on Zimbabwe power sharing government had focused mainly on the 
evaluation of the power sharing government as a positive step in democratization or as a 
messy sharing experiment that reinforced the electoral fraud of Africa’s ruling elites 
following elections without choice. Since elections provide citizens an opportunity to choose 
their leaders, the presidential runoff that precipitated the power sharing government was an 
election without choice as it was characterized by intimidation, politically motivated 
violence, militarization of the electoral process, targeted abductions and extra judicial killings 
against MDC supporters by the ZANU PF regime that led to the other contesting presidential 
candidate to withdraw from the elections while the international community rejected the 
outcome of the run off.  
Scholars have largely interrogated whether the resort to power sharing in Zimbabwe after 
electoral defeat was a messy sharing experiment because opposition politics access to state 
power was decreased and opportunities for regime change were marginalised  as power 
sharing offered incentives for “power hungry” leaders to  fight their way back to the 
negotiating table (Tull &Meller, 2005, Raftopoulos, 2013, Mazarire, 2013, Bratton and 
Masunungure, 2008; Badza, 2009, Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010, Mapuva, 2010, Matysak, 
2010 and Mehler, 2009). After Kenya and Zimbabwe were being ruled by power sharing 
governments, in 2011 the then Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo refused to cede power 
after Alassane Outtara had won the elections. The African Union decided to offer Gbagbo a 
place in government on condition of cessation of hostilities which offers incentives that 
promote undemocratic behaviour and increase the likelihood of incumbents to fight their way 
back into power (Beadsworth, 2012:21). The perspective of analyzing the effect of 
distributing ministries to competing political parties had been largely ignored and the 
understanding of these challenges may help in providing insights to make future power 
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sharing governments in Africa since these inclusive governments are being widely prescribed 
and practiced.  
The challenges of the power sharing government to effective public administration in 
Zimbabwe had not been thoroughly studied as very few authors have done so. Notable among 
the exception is Mukonza (2011) who analyzed the relationship between top bureaucrats 
especially permanent secretaries and head of departments with ministers. He concluded that 
the relationships between the senior bureaucrats in ministries manned by MDC ministers 
were poor and had a negative effect on service delivery. One of the prominent cases was a 
court case where Minister of Energy and Power Development Elton Mangoma (MDC-T) was 
being taken to court by his Permanent Secretary for unilaterally cancelling a tender and 
giving it to another company.  He said the following in his opposing court affidavit:  
In any event I need to set the record straight. I as the Minister of Energy and Power 
Development set policy and directions and not the permanent secretary. He 
(permanent secretary) can only write anything concerning parastatals on my say-so, 
not on his own initiative. He has no part except what I ask him to do. (Newsday, 
16/03/2011). 
 Another author is Zhou (2013:155) who argues that the major frontiers of public 
administration in Zimbabwe’s power sharing government were in a frail state as they were 
choked up by a top heavy bureaucracy; inter party bureaucratic politics, patronage and lack of 
collective will on the level of policy implementation. Moyo (2011) also argue that the power 
sharing government just witnessed policy slogans such as Look East policy, indigenization 
policy, parastatal reform policy, and multi-currency policy, which remained fuzzy from a 
public administration point of view in terms of policy design.  
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1.6 Research Design 
Babbie and Mouton (2008: 74) note that research design is a logical sequence that connects 
the empirical data to a study’s initial research questions and ultimately its conclusions. 
Following the above argument, this research seeks to answer the following questions: what 
challenges of coordination were experienced in Zimbabwe’s power sharing government on 
Green Fuel and restructuring of ZISCO in the period 2009-2013? Why did the Minister of 
Energy and Power Development Mr Elton Mangoma refuse to allow mandatory blending of 
ethanol? Why did the Minister of Mines and Mining Development Mr Obert Mpofu refuse to 
transfer mineral rights to EAHL that were critical for ZISCO to resume its operations?  
This study is a case study that focuses on Zimbabwe’s power sharing government during the 
period 2009 to 2013. Stake (2000: 435) argues “case studies have become one of the most 
common ways to do qualitative inquiry, but they are neither new nor essentially qualitative”. 
Neuman (2005:32) notes “a case study involves intensively investigating one or two case or 
comparing a limited number of cases and analytically studying them in detail”.  I am 
analyzing the two cases Green Fuel and restructuring of ZISCO each of them in its own 
chapter.  
According to Yin (2003: 2), a case study design should be considered when (a) the focus of 
the study is to answer a how and why question (b) you cannot manipulate the behavior of 
those involved in the study (c) you want to cover contextual conditions because you believe 
that there are relevant to the phenomenon under study (d) boundaries are not clear between 
the phenomenon and the context.  This study is mainly interested in the first three conditional 
dimensions. The main objective is to investigate what challenges of coordination were 
experienced in the case of the programs, but as the analysis unfolds, it will answer why did 
the Minister of Energy veto against mandatory blending of ethanol and why the Minister of 
Mines refused to transfer mineral rights to EAHL so that ZISCO can resume operations. On 
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Green Fuel in particular, this research also want to demonstrate that the contextual conditions 
of the power sharing government were a problem in that the main investor was a friend to 
ZANU PF and an enemy to MDC which created two different positions the parties in the 
inclusive government took. The behavior of those involved in the study cannot be 
manipulated as the power sharing government expired on 31 July 2013.  
A case study can be exploratory or descriptive and this one is an exploratory one. Babbie and 
Mouton (2008: 80) summarize the objectives of exploratory case study research as being to 
satisfy the researcher’s curiosity and desire for better understanding; test the feasibility of 
undertaking a more extensive study; develop methods to be employed in any subsequent 
study; explicate the central concepts and constructs of a study; determine priorities for future 
research; and develop new hypotheses about an existing phenomenon’. In this case, the 
researcher wants to develop a deeper understanding on ZISCO restructuring and the Green 
Fuel that started with laudable intentions, enthusiasm, commitments and prospects of 
thousands of jobs, only to deliver little as disagreements between ministries controlled by 
ministers from different political parties came to the surface.  Chadderton and Torrance 
(2011: 54) argue that a case study can also hold a policy to account in terms of complex 
realities of implementation and unintended consequences. This study analyses the 
unanticipated consequences of the two programs thereby holding the policies to account.  
Baxter and Jack (2008:548) note that it is important to include a proposition and theoretical 
development when doing a case study because it increases the likelihood that the researcher 
will be able to place limits on the scope of the study and increase the feasibility of completing 
the study. In this study, I posit that a power sharing government inhibits coordination through 
the distribution of ministries to competing political parties in the implementation of policies 
that cross ministerial jurisdictions controlled by ministers from different political parties 
since power sharing requires “individuals with incompatible identities to cooperate” (Spears, 
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2000:108). Governments with ministries controlled by ministers from different political 
parties increase coordination problems as they do not have common conceptions and always 
fail to agree on mechanisms that generate coordination (Peters, 2006:117).  I therefore 
conjecture in agreements with other authors that:  
Whenever parties join together to form a government, “there will be areas of substantial 
policy disagreements” and the lack of coordination is caused by “differential preferences” 
and trying to bring a certain outcome when cabinet ministers from different political parties 
are not in agreement over the particular form of action taken (Dowding, 1990:50; Scherman 
& Enner-Jedenastik; 2013:2). 
Laver and Shepsle (1996) theorize that cabinet ministers are policy dictators within their 
jurisdictions, and even though although cabinet as a collective is responsible for making 
policy decisions in a government, any decision taken by cabinet needs the expertise and 
cooperation of a certain government department to be implemented and it is the cabinet 
minister who is the political head of a major government department who as person with 
formal jurisdiction of that department is clearly in the driver’s seat in relation to any policy 
areas under his jurisdiction. I therefore conjecture that: 
A program is more likely to reach its intended end if the cabinet minister who control the 
corresponding ministerial portfolio is in agreement with the position taken by cabinet 
The major weakness of a case study is that its findings are not easily generalizable and is 
different from the scientific method used mainly in the natural sciences. It defeats the quest of 
finding universal truths, but the reality in the study of power sharing government is that they 
carry with themselves certain psychological, political and economic aspects which make it 
impossible to generate generalisations applicable to other contexts. This means there are 
likely to be no possible commonalities amenable to comparative research, but this is replaced 
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by a modest effort to develop an understanding of the variety of circumstances in which the 
coordination challenges emerged than trying to search for unique and identical features from 
other countries. It is therefore very difficult to treat power sharing governments in the 
geographically extensive world to be likely to produce certain common features because they 
are politically, culturally and economically diverse. The decisions made by various elites in a 
power sharing government are preconditioned by the different political structures in place.  
1.7 Data collection.  
The primary focus of this research is coordination challenges which make the data collection 
techniques purely qualitative. The hallmark of a case study research is the use of multiple 
sources of data which is a strategy that enhances credibility (Baxter & Jack, 2008: 554). They 
further argue that potential data sources may include but not limited to documentation, 
archival records, interviews, physical artifacts, direct observation and participant observation 
and each one source of data contributes to the researchers understanding of the phenomenon. 
In this study, I use multiple sources of information such as academic books, journal articles, 
newspapers, Parliamentary Hansards, Parliamentary Portfolio Committee reports, inter-
ministerial reports and media releases. The approach of using these documents goes back to a 
century old and is used mainly in the fields of history, literature, journalism, political science, 
education and sociology (Neuman (2005: 292). It has become popular especially when there 
are limited opportunities for conducting primary research (Heaton, 2003:81). 
 The Parliamentary Hansards provided invaluable information especially on ZISCO 
restructuring as the Portfolio Committee chairperson on Industry and Commerce made a 
presentation to the National Assembly on ZISCO restructuring and it provided in depth 
understanding of the challenges that hampered the successful restructuring and the discussion 
that followed the presentation was very helpful as members of the Committee gave further 
observations from their oversight research on ZISCO restructuring.  The question and answer 
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session done in parliament where Members of Parliament  directed questions to the principals 
of the power sharing government also provided an in-depth understanding of the problems. 
The greatest advantage of using the Parliament Hansards is that they are published on the 
parliament website and what was needed for me was just to download which minimized costs 
to the researcher.  
While the main disadvantage of using already collected data is that the researcher does not 
have control on how the data was collected, the main official source of reference which is the 
Zimbabwean Parliament Hansard follows the principles laid down in 1907 by the House of 
Commons Select Committee on Parliamentary Debates that; “It is a full report, in the first 
person, of all speakers alike, a full report being defined as; '...one which, though not strictly 
verbatim, is substantially the verbatim report, with repetitions and redundancies omitted and 
with obvious mistakes corrected, but which on the other hand leaves out nothing but adds to 
the meaning of the speech or illustrates the argument” (www.parlzim.gov.zw) .  
The other main source of information was newspapers as they provided a timeline of 
activities and on many occasions’ journalists interviewed the ministers concerned. Rather 
than directly interviewing the ministers who were involved, this study also made use of these 
interviews which the ministers had with newspapers or other media houses after realizing that 
interviewing them was tantamount to asking the same questions.  This was advantageous 
given that some of the ministers have as of now either changed portfolios or are out of the 
government pursuing other personal business outside the country. The newspapers were also 
crucial in that the ministers often did not confront each other to resolve their difference, but 
issued press releases or went to the media to be interviewed so as to outwit and discredit their 
political rivals instead of concentrating on implementing substantive public policies meant to 
benefit citizens (Nhede, 2012). Baxter and Jack (2008: 554) argue that when various sources 
of data are converged, it adds strength to the findings of the study as various strands of data 
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are braided to promote a greater understanding of the cases. The main advantage of using this 
approach is that I only collected data that answered the research question. 
1.8 Data analysis 
Data analysis involves compiling and assessing the evidence relating to the research question. 
Like any other qualitative study, the data collection and analysis occur concurrently (Jack and 
Baxter, 2008: 554). Yin (2003: 109) argues data analysis consists of “examining, 
categorizing, tabulating, testing, or otherwise recombining both quantitative and qualitative 
evidence to address the initial propositions of a study”. This study involved secondary 
analysis which involves the reworking of already analyzed or collected data which the 
researcher has no direct control or in which he had no direct involvement for a different 
purpose other than what it was initially collected for (Strydom and Delport, 2011). Hartley 
(2004: 329) notes that in a case study, “data collection and analysis are developed together in 
an iterative process which can be strength as it allows for theory development which is 
grounded in empirical evidence. Yin (2003) notes that it is important to always return back to 
the proposition in a case study because it leads to a more focused analysis when the 
temptation to analyze data are outside the scope the scope of the questions, exploring rival 
propositions is an attempt to provide an alternate explanation to a phenomenon and by 
engaging in the iterative process, the confidence in the findings increases the number of 
propositions and rival propositions are addressed, accepted or rejected.  
1.9 Zimbabwe’s Power Sharing Government: A brief overview of its formation 
It is important to first examine how Zimbabwe’s power sharing government came about 
before getting into the depth of the research  as this study will be incomplete without taking a 
brief look into the history of the factors that led to the formation of the power sharing 
government. Zimbabwe’s power sharing government also referred to as the inclusive 
government or Government of National Unity (GNU) involving ZANU PF led by Robert 
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Mugabe, MDC-T led by Morgan Tsvangirai and the other smaller MDC-M led by Professor 
Arthur Mutambara was not the first inclusive government in Zimbabwe. ZANU PF began its 
life at independence in 1980 composed of other liberation movements such as Zimbabwe 
African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and representatives of the former settler government 
(Raftopoulos, 2013: xii).  
Since the year 2000 when the MDC entered the politics of Zimbabwe, elections in Zimbabwe 
became an issue of major international interest with the Commonwealth, the European Union, 
United Kingdom,  the United States always saying the elections were fraudulent, while South 
Africa and other African Union organisation have always declared the elections credible and 
the game has continued to 2013. In 2002, Zimbabwe held a controversial violent presidential 
election and South Africa endorsed the elections as free and fair. However, it has serious 
electoral malpractices that led to the suspension of Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth 
which left the then South African President Thabo Mbeki trying to make the best from a bad 
job by trying to bring the two antagonists Robert Mugabe (ZANU PF) and Morgan 
Tsvangirai (MDC) together (Phimister, 2004:274). While the dialogue failed to materialise, 
Mazarire (2013:71) argues that the patterns that shaped the interests represented in 2002 
manifested themselves six years later in the form of South Africa playing a central role, the 
key interests of Morgan Tsvangirai and Robert Mugabe.  
The main event that triggered events leading to the formation of the power sharing 
government was an incident on 7 March 2007 when the state security officials assaulted civil 
and political leaders triggering robust international opprobrium for holding a prayer meeting 
(Masunungure, 2009a).  The scenes of brutality seared into the swollen faces and battered 
heads as well as broken limbs of Zimbabwe opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai and other 
civil society leaders shocked the world (Sachikonye, 2011:1). Fifty others were hospitalized 
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and more than 200 were arrested. Media coverage of these events evoked an international 
outcry from the governments of Great Britain, the European Union and the United States.  
A combination of international pressure as well as concerned voices in SADC led to an extra 
ordinary SADC Heads of State summit in Dar es Salam on 28 to 29 March 2007. The 
summit’s final communiqué commissioned President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa to 
facilitate dialogue between government and opposition in Zimbabwe (Masunungure, 2009a). 
The negotiations by the elites that followed dealt away with the electoral system that had had 
reflected a one party state hegemony (Sachikonye, 2011:46). The word elite refer to persons 
who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organisations and 
movements of whatever kind, are able to affect the national political outcomes substantially 
(Higley & Burton, 1989: 17). Masunungure (2009a) argues at this time, very few recognised 
the transition processes triggered by 07 March 2007 and fewer realised the irreversibility of 
the political transition that was to follow. The critical importance of the 2007 interparty 
dialogue was that it repelled the presidential patronage appointment of additional assembly 
members and levelled the electoral playing field for contesting political parties and increased 
the parliamentary seats from 120 to 210 for March 2008 (Sachikonye, 2011:27).  
On 29 March 2008, Zimbabwe held its first ever-harmonized election for the Presidency, the 
Senate, House of Assembly and local council held on one day and the results were posted 
outside every polling station for everyone to see (Masunungure, 2009b:1). The Zimbabwe 
African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) was defeated in the parliamentary 
election. Mugabe was also defeated in the first round of the presidential election by Morgan 
Tsvangirai. The combined MDCs won a total of 109 seats against ZANU PF’s 97, with 
Tsvangirai polling 47.9% of the presidential vote against Mugabe’s 43.2% for presidency, 
thus failing to deliver a decisive winner of the 50 percent plus one majority (Raftopoulos, 
2009:229). This then mandated a constitutionally mandated run off.  
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The constitutionally mandated run off was done on 27 June 2008 and the period running to 
that election is known as the reign of terror as President Robert Mugabe resorted to election 
violence, imprisonment of opposition supporters, total disregard of peoples will and 
repression of the electorate by the security forces of the state never seen in postcolonial 
Zimbabwe. The reign of terror was directed by the Joint Operations Command1 as ZANU PF 
came to the conclusion that the party had failed in the march to 29 March election and the 
military took over the march to 27 June election (Masunungure (2009b: 81). The period 
witnessed systematic orchestrated violence deployed against opposition supporters by the 
Mugabe regime that had monopolized it for the preceding 28 years (Masunungure, 2011:54).  
The vicious crackdown against opposition supporters was the darkest hour in the country’s 
political history as “ZANU PF, the security forces and its militia allies crackdown resulted in 
the death of opposition officials and supporters, thousand politically motivated beatings and 
the displacement of more than 200 000 people mainly in rural areas” (Bratton, 2011:359). 
Zimbabwe was reduced to a “Hobbesian state of nature, in which life became solitary, nasty, 
brutish and short” (Masunungure, 2009b:87). The brutality and savagery of the beatings, 
torture and killings was staggering as the age of the victims was ten percent of victims were 
under the age of 12 and 15% were over the age of 60 which makes it incredible if not 
shocking (Sachikonye, 2011:51). The scale of violence was intense that a week prior to the 
presidential runoff, Mbeki made spirited efforts to have the election cancelled urging the two 
parties to start negotiating a Government of National Unity (Tarisayi, 2009:23).  
Fearing for his life and the safety of his supporters, Tsvangirai withdrew from the runoff, 
sought refuge at the Dutch Embassy in Harare and “Mugabe grasped a hollow victory from a 
brutalized and shrunken electorate which was rejected by the international community” 
1 Joint Operations Command refers to heads of security institutions of the state comprising the police, 
intelligence, defense and correctional services 
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(Bratton, 2011: 359). After the presidential run off ZANU PF had lost political and 
international legitimacy but still in control of coercive arms of state, while Tsvangirai’s 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) could not assume state power through the March 
elections while the cost of state repression against its supporters was rising.  Masunungure 
(2009a) argues that at this time, ZANU PF was suffering from a debilitating double crisis at 
home notably a crisis of legitimacy and a crisis of efficacy. He argues the crisis of legitimacy 
was a consequence of the erosion of electoral legitimacy caused by the dramatic shift in 
public allegiance from ZANU PF towards the MDC. The crisis of efficacy was a 
consequence of the incapacity in delivering public goods and services. Bunquet (2007:203) 
argues that legitimacy and efficacy are “the two essential attributes that any political party 
requires to be considered successful and these dimensions interact with each other”.  
This post-election crisis re-triggered SADC re-engagement with the Zimbabwe crisis with 
SADC again under Mbeki having power sharing as the first option using the template applied 
in other African contexts notably Kenya leading to the signing of the Global Political 
Agreement (GPA) on 15 September 2008 (Masunungure & Mutasa, 2011:134). The GPA 
split the executive by retaining the post of the president, which Mugabe retained, and 
introducing the post of Prime Minister for Tsvangirai. The GPA was given constitutional 
legitimacy through constitutional amendment Number 19, clearing the way for the instalment 
of the inclusive government in February 2009. The GNU was a major departure from the 
previous unitary executive because “ZANU PF hegemony was broken like virginity” through 
the creation of a power sharing government in the form of a dual executive with an executive 
president with cabinet ministers from his own party and an executive prime minister with 
ministers from his own party (Masunungure; 2009a). The GPA provided for 31 ministers, 15 
from ZANU PF, 13 from MDC-T and 3 for the other smaller MDC faction. Masunungure 
(2009a) argues that the government was further divided in that the president had the support 
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of the military while the prime minister had support of parliament making it one country with 
two governments two, two leaders.  
1.10 Ethical statement  
This study does not involve direct interaction with any people. All work used in this study 
was appropriately referenced.  
1.11 Outline of study 
Chapter 1 Introduction, aims, problem statement and methodology and a brief background to 
the political, economic and social factors giving rise to Zimbabwe’s power sharing 
government in 2009 
Chapter 2 Reviews literature on the meaning of coordination, why coordination is important 
in a government and theoretical arguments on ministerial jurisdiction  
Chapter 3 analyzes the Green Fuel Project from its inception, advantages of bio-fuel, 
coordination challenges and implications to the community surrounding the bio-ethanol plant 
Chapter 4 Explores issues around the restructuring of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company 
by first looking at the historical development of ZISCO, its decline, the restructuring process, 
coordination challenges, implications to the workers 
Chapter: 5 Conclusion of study 
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2 Chapter 2 Literature Review and Theoretical Considerations 
2.1 Introduction  
The literature review is presented within the coordination discourse. It is divided into three 
parts. The first one defines the meaning of the term coordination, followed by a discussion on 
the importance of coordination in the public sector and ends by discussing the theoretical 
framework since a case study benefits from prior development of theoretical propositions to 
guide data collection and analyses (Yin, 2003).  
2.2 What is coordination  
In literature, coordination is the “philosopher’s cornerstone in the analysis of good public 
administration” (Peters, 2006:115). Since the 1970’s, coordination became a hot issue in both 
academia and for government practitioners (Hustedt & Tiessen, 2006: 2). It has been 
discussed widely in the political science and public administration literature (Perri 6, 2004). 
The discussion on coordination had been largely driven by planning debates interested in 
improving the policy making process in order to enable governments to take long term 
societal developments into account as well as the real interdependency of society’s problems 
(Philips, 2004: 283).  
Even though the discussion on coordination started in the 1970s, it had not yielded an agreed 
upon state of the art definition (Perri 6, 2004). Peters (1998:296) argues that the word 
coordination is used with almost universal approbation in the literature on public 
administration and political science, but less often defined. The literature on coordination is 
also beset with different terminologies such as connected government in Australia 
(Management Advisory Committee, 2004), cooperative governance in South Africa (The 
Presidency, 2001), joined up government in the United Kingdom (Cabinet Office, 2000), 
horizontal government in Canada (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004) and integrated government in New 
Zealand (Halligan et al, 2011: 74).  
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However, irrespective of the terminology used, these concepts essentially provide labels for 
the principle of horizontal coordination in public administration which has challenged 
governments for decades (Hood, 2005:6). All of them emphasize objectives shared across 
organizational boundaries as opposed to working within an organization (Management 
Advisory Committee, 2004).  The term joined up government for example was introduced in 
the United Kingdom by the Blair government which came to power in 1997 as a significant 
component of its modernization program with the aims of ensuring that policies were more 
joined and strategic (Cabinet Office, 2000). These reforms targeted the perceived sin in the 
British government of departmentalism (Kavanagh & Richards, 2001:1). The motives of 
joined up government according to Politt (2003: 35) were to  
• Eliminate contradictions and tensions between different policies and is therefore 
aimed at increasing the effectiveness of policies 
• To make better use of resources through elimination and or duplication and or 
contradiction between different programs  
• To improve a flow of good ideas and cooperation between different stakeholders in a 
particular policy sector thus producing synergy or smarter ways of working.  
• To produce a more integrated or seamless set of services from the point of views of 
citizens who use them  
The focus on coordination is mainly interested with the problems that are resistant to 
departmental approaches (Bogdanor, 2005: 6). Case studies had been problems such as 
indigenous disadvantage, land degradation, climate change and obesity in Australia 
(Management Advisory Committee, 2004), teenage pregnancy and homelessness in Britain 
(Cabinet Office, 2000), gangs and family violence in New Zealand and more generally crime, 
immigration, poverty and national security (Halligan, 2011). In fact, governments all over the 
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world have come to recognize that complex public policy problems cannot be solved on their 
own and have turned to a more collaborative process of collective problem solving that 
involves partnership and interdependence at its central core (Philips, 2004: 283).  
Kernaghan and Siegel (1987: 263) notes that coordination is a conception that two or more 
parties take one another into account for the purpose of bringing together their decisions 
and/or activities into harmonious or reciprocal relation (cited in Halligan 2011: 83). 
Coordination according to Peters (2006: 117; 1998: 296) is the “negotiation of differences 
among policy making ministries, avoiding conflict and achieving a certain level of 
integration” or the state at which “government programs or policies are characterized by 
minimal redundancy, incoherence, and lacunae”.  It is a perspective that holds that all or 
many parts of the executive government should interconnect, complement one another and 
pool related information (Hood, 2005: 19). Wamsley (1975) notes that “coordination requires 
negotiations in the contexts of competing interests among policy making ministries, making 
major compromises through resolving the irresolvable and achieving a certain level of 
integration” (cited in Peters, 1998: 299).  
Halligan et al (2011:84) argue that coordination and integration can be differentiated or 
considered as clusters of activities in a spectrum. Perri 6 (2004: 3) notes the word 
coordination refers to rudimentary activities involving the development of ideas about joint 
holistic working, joint information systems, dialogue between agencies, processes of 
planning and decision making stopping short on implementation. He contrasts it to 
integration which refers to the actual execution or implementation of the products of 
coordination through the development of common organizational structures and merged 
professional practices and interventions (ibid).  
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The language of coordination also contains a strong flavor of collaboration (Halligan etal, 
2011). The unanswered question that remains come from the linking of collaboration with 
more joined up, horizontal forms of governing is whether they are forms of collaboration or 
whether collaboration is required to operationalize these forms of governing, that is 
collaboration an enabler of coordination (Halligan et al, 2011). Bakvis and Juillet (2004:8-9) 
define collaboration as the active process of not only coordinating activities, but also 
developing, committing resources, agreeing to and implementing a strategy for achieving set 
objectives.  
Peters (1998) differentiates policy and administrative coordination with the former occurring 
at the top, that is at the level of officials and cabinet, while the later involves mainly the 
implementation and management of policies and programs at all levels. Peters (2006:117) 
differentiates positive and negative coordination with the former implying avoiding direct 
conflicts among programs while the later implies a more active stance of assuring that 
programs work together effectively and support each other.  
Coordination can be vertical or horizontal which is the focus of this study. Vertical 
coordination is the coordination of state responsibilities distributed across spheres of 
government, which is national, provincial and local government (Kraak, 2011: 344). This 
study focuses on horizontal coordination which is “the management of two or more 
departments within the state where the units in question do not have hierarchical control over 
each other and where the aim is to generate outcomes that are not achievable with 
departments working in isolation with each other so that horizontal objectives are not 
achieved with the action of another department” (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004:8).  
2.3 Why is coordination needed?  
There are many reasons that make governments around the world put out policies to enhance 
coordination based on domestic and external factors that may include security threats, 
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citizens demanding better services and the complexity of problems such as climate change 
and environmental degradation whose solutions are not a responsibility of one government 
ministry. In this section I discuss one of the problehms that results from the division of 
government into different ministries as it is important for the theoretical framework discussed 
later.  
The main goal of coordination is to produce coherent government policies and achieve a state 
that minimizes conflicts that arise from ministries over programs (Hustedt & Tiessen, 
2006:5). Coherent policies refer to programs free from contradictions (ibid). In its simplest 
form, coordination is about working collaboratively with officials in other portfolios and 
across jurisdictions to integrate policies and programs (Halligan, et al, 2006:76). Conflict and 
lack of coordination in a government is caused by “differential preferences” and trying to 
bring a certain outcome when not all cabinet ministers or departments are in agreement over 
the particular form of action taken (Dowding, 1990:50).   
The lack of horizontal coordination is usually caused by departmentalism. Departmentalism 
emanates from the specialization in the development of policy proposals which gives 
ministers in charge of a certain government department jurisdiction (Laver and Shepsle, 
1996:13).  The formal jurisdiction of a government department’s is usually determined by the 
constitution (Laver and Shepsle, 1996: 30). For instance, the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Defence involves defending and safeguarding the country. This division of government into 
ministries or departments implies that government decision-making is broken up into a series 
of component parts relating particular policy areas which creates the siloisation and 
pillarisation of government ministries and ministers will have little time and energy about 
policy proposals from areas outside its jurisdiction. This breeds a problem known as 
departmentalism.  
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Departmentalism is a term that covers a mix of policy, governmental and political pathologies 
where political and administrative boundaries are vigorously guarded and jealously upheld in 
vertical silos (Hunt, 2005:8, Kavananagh & Richards, 2001:1). Kavanagh and Richards 
(2000:1) explain departmentalism in terms of public choice theory where ministries operate 
as self-interested utility maximizers, making it quite logical for themselves to build their own 
empires. The implicit assumptions of rational choice theorists is that individuals attempt to 
maximize their marginal utility as their actions are determined by what they desire and what 
they believe to be possible (Dowding, 1991:23).  
Departmentalism is efficient and effective in managing certain areas of public policy that 
operate with strict legislative and accountability frameworks for the expenditure of public 
funds and effective at keeping tight control over scarce resources and ensuring that those 
resources are used efficiently and effectively (Cabinet Office, 2000:12).   However, it inhibits 
effective cross departmental working. Both citizens and public officials tend to be distressed 
when objectives are not achieved by ministers or civil servants operating in chimneys, 
protecting their own turf and interests rather than advancing government programs (Richards 
& Kavanagh, 2001:2). The lack of coordination results in increased costs while the worst 
effects are suffered by citizens who fail to secure the much needed services, results in 
increased costs, wastes public money, reduce the public respect for the management of the 
public sector, generate conflict and reduce policy creativity while lack of fertilization of ideas 
reduce adaptive and innovative capacity of any organization (Peters, 1998a:33).  
2.4 Theoretical Framework 
As noted earlier on, power sharing government involves the distribution of bureaucratic posts 
to competing political parties in the power sharing deal. However, the major problem with 
power sharing governments is that “power is not shared, but it is divided and power sharing 
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partners exercise power differently within exclusive and competing zones of authority” 
(Bratton and Masunungure, 2011:34).  
The Global Political Agreement that paved way for the power sharing government in 
Zimbabwe not only created a dual executive in the form of an executive president and prime 
minister, but provided for 31 ministers, 15 from ZANU PF, 13 from MDC-T and 3 for the 
other smaller MDC-M faction. This composition of cabinet meant that everything has to be 
made by consensus, but there was no provision in the GPA to what will happen if there was 
no consensus in government. Zimbabwe’s power sharing government also brought together 
ideologically irreconcilable foes with the MDC formations favouring liberal economic and 
political reforms which were against ZANU PFs socialist and antidemocratic practices 
(Bratton and Masunungure, 2009: 44). Neither the 1979 Lancaster House Constitution nor 
subsequent legislation provided frameworks for cooperative governance. 
Governments with ministries controlled by ministers from different political parties increase 
coordination problems as they do not have common conceptions and always fail to agree on 
mechanisms that generate coordination (Peters, 2006:117). More so LeVan (2011:31) notes, 
“If the policy process incorporates more political players with distinct ideological preferences 
and the leverage to act on them, gridlock or immobilism is more likely”. Bratton and 
Masunungure (2011:34) argue that the major problem with power sharing governments is that 
“power is not shared, but it is divided and power sharing partners exercise power differently 
within exclusive and competing zones of authority which undermines their effectiveness”. 
LeVan (2011: 39) also argues that in a power sharing government elites exercise dual 
sovereignty the elites act as if they belong to separate governments. Lemerchard (2007) with 
respect to disagreements in the Rwandan power sharing government notes the following 
quoting from Benjamin Disraeli novel The Two Nations, “There is no intercourse and 
sympathy. They are ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts and feelings as if they were 
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dwellers of different zones or inhabitants of different places”. Bratton (2011:360) on 
disagreements in Zimbabwe’s inclusive government concludes that “the elites were always in 
protracted struggles over constitutional, judicial, security, fiscal and media reforms largely 
driven by Mugabe’s extreme reluctance to surrender the prerogatives of the executive 
presidency”.  
In order to analyze, the complexity of coordination in Zimbabwe’s power sharing 
government, this study adopts Laver and Shepsle (1996) arguments on ministerial discretion 
as a theoretical framework.  
Laver and Shepsle (1996:13) note the most distinctive part in a parliamentary democracy is 
that most policy decisions are taken by the executives in a government especially the Cabinet.  
The Cabinet is not just a collection of identical partners, but it consists of autonomous and 
independent politicians, each with responsible for policy formulation and implementation in 
some particular field.  Even though cabinet as a collective is responsible for making policy 
decisions in a government, Laver and Shepsle (1996:30) argue that public administration is so 
complex that that any decision taken by cabinet needs the expertise and cooperation of a 
certain government department to be implemented and it is the cabinet minister who is the 
political head of a major government department who as person with formal jurisdiction of 
that department is clearly in the driver’s seat in relation to any policy areas under his 
jurisdiction.  
Laver and Shepsle (1996:13) argue that this means that government departments and their 
political masters have considerable agenda power as the entire process of policy formation is 
influenced by whoever has the political control over the relevant government department; that 
is the cabinet minister in charge of the department concerned (1996:13). This specialization 
in the development of policy proposals in government implies that the most credible signal of 
28 
 
 
 
 
 
government policy on particular issues is the policy associated with the minister in charge of 
a department with jurisdiction over that issue (Laver and Shepsle, 1996:13). They therefore 
argue that this creates a departmental character of government decision making as this entails 
that government decision making is broken up into a series of component parts relating 
particular policy areas (ibid).  
Given that a cabinet position on a policy matter can diverge with a position of a minister in 
charge of a ministry since anything agreed by cabinet still needs the expertise and 
cooperation of a certain government department to be implemented, I therefore conjecture 
that: 
A program is more likely to reach its intended end if the cabinet minister who control the 
corresponding ministerial portfolio is in agreement with the position taken by cabinet as a 
collective 
 More so, Laver and Shepsle (1996: 32) argue that each minister in a government has 
considerable discretion to act, in his or her own department independently of other members 
of cabinet.  This ministerial discretion is sustained principally by the control over the policy 
agenda that each minister exercises in his or her own departmental jurisdiction (1996:32). 
This ministerial discretion results from his ability to use his or her own power as a head of a 
major government department to influence the substance of any specific proposals that 
matters within his or her own jurisdiction (ibid).  Christensen (2006: 230) argues that students 
of agenda setting have largely ignored agenda power and its importance to veto proposals 
which is a powerful tool used with those in jurisdiction. This discretion had been noted earlier 
on in relation to case in which the Minister of Energy and Power Development Elton 
Mangoma (MDC-T) was accused of unilaterally cancelling a tender and giving it to another 
company he said the following in his opposing court affidavit “In any event I need to set the 
29 
 
 
 
 
 
record straight. I as the Minister of Energy and Power Development set policy and 
directions……” 
In a power sharing government, the allocation of ministerial portfolios has another dimension 
as it means the allocation of authority in particular policy jurisdictions to particular political 
parties. The problem with this is that is that a party’s position on one issue is correlated to 
another position on the other (Laver and Shepsle, 1996: 13). Laver and Shepsle (1996) 
typified this by arguing that a party position on divorce can be associated with a position on 
abortion. The logic of this argument is that an overall policy position taken by a minister on a 
policy position is associated with another position on another matter. It is important to get 
hold of this argument as it will be illustrated in greater depth in the next chapter.  
 I argue that in a power sharing government, the allocation of ministerial portfolios is no less 
separable from allocating portfolio to parties and it is for this reason that this study focuses on 
policy jurisdictions in four ministries in the analysis of the complexity of coordination. Given 
that different party positions are likely to have an effect on the outcome of policies that 
crosses to another ministry controlled by a minister from a different political party, the use of 
ministerial discretion can involve using this ministerial discretion vis-à-vis programs from 
ministries controlled by another political party, I therefore conjecture in agreement with other 
scholars that:  
Whenever parties join together to form a government, “there will be areas of substantial 
policy disagreements and the lack of coordination is caused by “differential preferences” 
and trying to bring a certain outcome when cabinet ministers from different political parties 
are not in agreement over the particular form of action taken (Dowding, 1990:50; Scherman 
& Enner-Jedenastik; 2013:2). 
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Working from the above theoretical premise, I argue in this thesis that a cabinet in a power 
sharing government is not just a collection of identical partners, but a “distribution of specific 
powers over policy formulation and implementation to ministers” (Laver & Shepsle, 1996: 
282). Ministers in a power sharing government are “policy dictators” within jurisdictions who 
have the capacity to initiate or block policy changes from another ministry (Schermann & 
Enner-Jedenastrik, 2013:5). This study argues that while departmentalism is an everyday 
problem in public administration, a power sharing governments accentuates this problem as 
“it increases veto players” by giving power to ministers from different political parties which 
makes coordination mechanisms more complex, ambiguous and decreases efficiency and 
effectiveness of government as a whole in implementing policies that cross ministerial 
jurisdiction controlled by different political parties.   
 
2.5 Summary  
Various countries use different terminologies such as connected government in Australia 
(Management Advisory Committee, 2004), cooperative governance in South Africa (The 
Presidency, 2001), joined up government in the United Kingdom (Cabinet Office, 2000), 
horizontal government in Canada (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004) and integrated government in New 
Zealand (Halligan et al, 2011: 74).  However, irrespective of the terminology used, these 
concepts essentially mean that government departments must work together to achieve 
horizontal coordination (Hood, 2005:6). 
The division of government into ministries breeds departmentalism that emanates from the 
specialization in the development of policy proposals which gives ministers in charge of a 
certain government department jurisdiction (Laver and Shepsle, 1996). Shepsle and Laver 
(1996) argue that departmentalism gives ministerial discretion and jurisdiction to a cabinet 
minister that he/she exercises as the political head of a major government department to 
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influence the substance of any specific proposals that matters within his or her own 
jurisdiction. The consequences of this ministerial discretion is fundamental to the study of 
coordination in a power sharing government as this study argues that each minister will act as 
far as possible using this discretion to implement or veto against policies from another 
department controlled by another political party within his or her own jurisdiction.  
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3 Chapter 3: Green Fuel  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses Green Fuel and is divided into five parts. It starts by giving a brief 
background about Green Fuel, the potential benefits of Green Fuel, the discussion of the 
coordination problems explaining why the Minister of Energy and Power Development Elton 
Mangoma refused to allow mandatory blending on ethanol. As argued by Yin (2003), the 
analysis will continuously return to the theoretical propositions as this leads to more focused 
analysis.  
3.2 Brief background about the Green Fuel Project 
Green Fuel is a large scale ethanol producing factory in Sub Saharan Africa, manufacturing 
anhydrous ethanol from sugar cane to supply Zimbabwe and the region, with a clean, 
efficient and renewable fuel source. Green Fuel produces high quality anhydrous ethanol with 
less than 0.04% water content, generating the best performing fuel in the market 
(greenfuel.co.zw). The operation is situated in the districts of Chisumbanje and Middle Sabi 
which lie within the agro-ecological region five in Zimbabwe. It is situated 95km South of 
Birchnough Bridge and 500km from the capital Harare along Tanganda Ngundu Road. The 
plant is set on 46 000 hectares of land for which by 2012, 8500 hectares were under 
sugarcane (Mutopo & Chiweshe, 2012:8) 
The company first acquired lands by securing a 20 year build operate and transfer (BOT) 
with a quasi-government parastatal Agricultural Research and Development Authority 
(ARDA) which was under the Ministry of Agriculture which was controlled by a ZANU PF 
minister (Duvenage etal 2013, 134).  Green Fuel opted for previously cultivated land and 
irrigation schemes belonging to ARDA that were in need of comprehensive refurbishment 
owing to obsolesce through neglect. In addition, Green Fuel acquired land from local farmers 
contiguous to ARDA (Duvenage etal 2013, 134).  
33 
 
 
 
 
 
The plant is the biggest of its kind in Africa directly employing 4500 people and creating 
thousands of jobs in support downstream and upstream project (Matopo and Chiweshe, 
2012:9). The plant was built at a cost of US$ 600 million and is a private partnership between 
ARDA and private firms Macdom Investments and Rating Investments. The efficiency 
operational performance by Green Fuel of achieving 150 tonnes of sugarcane attracted 
finance from lending institutions to the tune of US$ 150 million to facilitate the completion 
of the implementation phase (Duvenage etal , 2013:136).  
The main funder of these private firms is Billy Rautenbach, a controversial white 
businessman who is on the United State and European Union targeted sanction list because of 
his financial support Mugabe's ZANU PF party via his proceeds from mining projects. This is 
very, very important for this chapter as the party’s position on one matter was going to be 
associated on another. On the other hand, the MDC and its supporters since 2000 elections 
campaigns were the victims of human rights abuses as they had been subject to widespread 
violence, murder, attempted murder, torture, rape, disappearances and death threats with most 
of carried by ZANU PF militias, war veterans and some members of the security services 
(Raftopoulos, 2009:215). An article by Simpson and Westbrock (2014) notes that Rautenbach 
helped the ZANU PF regime buy 642 vehicles with his companies just before the presidential 
runoff of June 2008. The cars were mostly Isuzu pickups, Toyota SUVs, and minivans at 
US$65,000 each in cash per truck. These cars were used during the presidential runoff that 
saw many MDC supporters lose life, property while other were displaced and injured in state 
sponsored violence. Makombe (2013:5) describes Rautenbach’s Macdom Investments and 
Ratings Investments as having no known institutional history with Rautenbach having 
engaged major financial scandals in South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
where he looted diamonds from the mineral rich country.   
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3.3 The potential benefits of the Green Fuel 
Green Fuel had laudable intentions and benefits to the country. With Zimbabwe as a 
landlocked country, it is exposed to fuel insecurity and volatility of oil prices and it imports 
all its oil needs (Duvenage et al, 2013: 134). Musanzikwa (2013:45) argues that the project 
was to aid economic recovery, providing a domestic, cost-effective alternative to imported oil 
while ethanol production can stimulate economic activity at local and national level with the 
potential to provide economic development opportunities, stimulating job-creation, tax base 
diversification and new capital investments. Thondhlana (2014:1) notes that Green Fuel 
development had benefits to the national government because of less reliance on fossil fuel, 
reduction of import bills, generation of electricity as a by product and raising the much 
needed foreign currency through exports into regional and international markets. He also 
argues that the project had the capacity to produce 100 million litres of ethanol annual to 
meet 50% of Zimbabwe’s fuel needs, trigger national development and create more than 5000 
jobs. More so, it was a perfect substitute for fossil fuels as it minimizes greenhouse gas 
emissions. Therefore, the project was of strategic importance with potential benefits that 
could fulfil national economic and political priorities (Mutambara, 2012).  
The Green Fuel’s website says the company will build four ethanol manufacturing plants 
“with an annual capacity of 1.5-billion litres to meet Zimbabwe’s domestic requirements and 
export the balance to the external regional markets while co-generating 120 megawatts of 
electricity” (greenfuel.co.zw).  During the early phases, the Green Fuel management and 
ARDA were optimistic that there was a ready market for Green Fuel products in Zimbabwe 
only for experience to teach them that they were mistaken. At the initial stages, Green Fuel 
did not know that it was treading on a lion’s tail and it courted and met disaster as the project 
joined the politics of ZANU PF and MDC in the power sharing government. One may ask 
who will have doubted the benevolent objectives of Green Fuel in cutting the fuel import bill 
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and creating the much needed jobs in a country with high unemployment rate.  The project 
raised high expectations, only to deliver meagre results. What was lying ahead of it was what 
the sociologist Robert Merton (1936) calls “the unanticipated consequences of purposive 
social action” where the actual results differed from the expected.   
3.4 Discussion of coordination problems in the Green Fuel Project 
The problems the project faced were summed up by Deputy Prime Minister Professor Arthur 
Mutambara as “politics and politics and more politics between our political parties with 
tussling and fighting among our parties to unlock political capital out of the Ethanol Project” 
(Parliamentary Hansard, 20/02/2013). The predicted consequence was that for Green Fuel 
was for blended fuel to be consumed as an end product. For this to happen, it needed the 
cooperation of the Minister of Power and Energy Development to put out a policy or 
legislation that would enforce fuel suppliers to blend their fuel with ethanol. This ministry 
was under Elton Mangoma (MDC-T). He was the cabinet minister who as the political head 
of a major government Department of Energy was in the driver’s seat in relation to any policy 
that fall under this ministry.  In other words, he was the person who had jurisdiction over 
energy issues and he had considerable agenda power and veto powers to stop the 
consumption of the blended fuel (Laver and Sheplse, 1996). He was the veto player whose 
cooperation was important for the blended ethanol to find its way into the market. This is the 
main reason why coordination is important because governments require joint decision 
making from the political machinery as government programs can be achieved only through 
some coordination of some kind to move towards a certain end (Hood, 2005: 19-20). 
Unfortunately, Energy and Power Development Minister, Elton Mangoma who had the 
ministerial discretion to influence the substance of any specific proposals that mattered within 
the energy ministry ruled out mandatory blending of petrol and ethanol. This led the US$600 
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million Green Fuel ethanol project to ground its operations and imperilled some 5000 direct 
jobs the company had created (Nyambabvu, 2012). 
 Green Fuel was made to hold onto 10 million litres of product and stopped ethanol 
production at its Chisumbanje plant after running of storage space leaving thousands of 
workers at risk of losing their jobs and adversely impacting out grower farmers who supplied 
cane to the mill (ibid). Pressman and Wildavsky (1973: 87) argue that when programs that 
start with much enthusiasm fail to achieve their predicted consequences, it does not require a 
cry explanation, but one need to just look into the intense conflict of interests involved and 
the antagonism of the people who had to cooperate which must not surprise the analyst as the 
program will be only having an agreement from the initiators themselves.   
3.5 Why did the Minister of Energy Rule against Mandatory Blending? 
The Minister of Energy used his ministerial discretion against mandatory blending for various 
reasons. First, Minister Mangoma ruled out the possibility of any fuel blending policy 
primarily because the project was done without his consultation whilst the MDC was already 
in the inclusive government and to him this was tantamount to nullifying the inclusive 
government. It is said that on 19 March 2009, just after a month following the formation of 
the inclusive government, a letter authorising Rautenbach to operate the ethanol project at 
ARDA’s Chisumbanje Estate  was signed but never disclosed it to Cabinet (MDC Press 
Release, 05/09/2012). He said  
They signed what we call a BOT Agreement with ARDA on the back without any of 
government knowing about it and this is an arrangement that should have been 
sanctioned by cabinet and we were already part of that cabinet when this thing was 
signed and it didn’t happen but that is not the issue. (Mangoma Interview with 
Nehanda Radio, 31/08/2012)  
Second, Minister Mangoma was opposed to any fuel blending policy arguing that the state 
could not be seen to be making legislation for an individual since the project was for 
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Rautenbach and the Ministry of Agriculture through ARDA and not with the Government of 
Zimbabwe. He said  
You could not use public policy to benefit an individual. This means that you cannot 
let an individual benefit by forcing people to buy a product that has failed to find 
traction on the market. If you have got your own product which you have been 
allowed to put onto the market you cannot turn around and say my product is not 
being bought, now government please force everybody to buy my product, whichever 
product it might be (Mangoma Interview with Nehanda Radio, 31/08/2012).  
 
Energy Minister Elton Mangoma insisted that the ethanol project was not granted national 
project status and therefore will not make public policy to benefit individuals. National 
project status was given by the Ministry of Finance which was headed by Tendai Biti who 
was also a MDC-T minister and MDC-T Secretary General. He argued that government 
position on mandatory blending was that it must be a joint venture with the state. Minister 
Mangoma said: 
The position of the government is very clear that no license should be granted to an 
individual and the government then issued a stance to the instrument that says very 
categorically that the person who will be granted the license for mandatory blending 
would be in a joint venture with the government and that was the position; it was 
issued last year in time2. The critical thing that is there is you cannot make a public 
policy to benefit an individual, it has never been done anywhere and it is what we call 
corruption if it’s done anywhere (Mangoma interview with Chikanza, 2013).   
This argument was taken further by Deputy Prime Minister Professor Mutambara who said 
the government cannot have mandatory blending for one private producer of ethanol. He 
argued that for mandatory blending to happen, Green Fuel must be converted into a joint 
venture with the Government of Zimbabwe and not a build operate transfer with the quasi-
government institution ARDA. He also said Green Fuel should design an acceptable 
insurance policy framework that will compensate all motorists in the event that any damage 
happened to vehicles resulting from the use of blended fuel (Mutambara, 2012).  
2 The cabinet position is discussed later in the next pages 
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In the eyes of Minister Mangoma, Green Fuel was part of ZANU PF habit of running policies 
that had not been approved by cabinet. Minister Mangoma said “ZANU PF ministers are the 
ones who are in the habit of running with policies that have not been approved by Cabinet as 
is clearly demonstrated also by Saviour Kasukuwere [Minister of Indegenisation and 
Economic Empowerment] in his ZANU PF indigenisation nonsense which was not well 
thought out” (MDC Press Release, 05/09/2012). 
Laver and Shepsle (1996: 13) argue that when cabinet portfolios are divided between 
competing political parties, a party’s position on one issue is correlated to another position on 
the other. This then makes the allocation of ministerial portfolios no less separable from 
allocating portfolio to parties (Laver & Shepsle, 1996:24) and this was the case with Green 
Fuel. This brings the argument that whenever parties join together to form a government, 
“there will be areas of substantial policy disagreements because of “differential preferences” 
in trying to bring a certain outcome when cabinet ministers from different political parties are 
not in agreement over the particular form of action taken (Dowding, 1990:50; Scherman & 
Enner-Jedenastik; 2013:2). 
ZANU PF relationship with Rautenbach influenced its position on Green Fuel while MDC as 
victims of Rautenbach sponsored abuses influenced its position. The late Higher and Tertiary 
Education Minister Stan Mudenge (ZANU PF) for example said opponents of the project 
were MDC supporters. He said "Because the MDC knows our links with Billy, they want to 
disturb our relationship by claiming that Billy is a white man who should not benefit from the 
land reform programme. Billy is our friend and a ZANU-PF friend and therefore those who 
want his eviction are MDC supporters3”. The late Vice President John Nkomo (ZANU PF) 
said “We have to support development and this is one such development which we have to 
3 Chikari, O (2010) Nkomo back Rautenbach Project 
http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/jan12a_2010.html#Z11 accessed 25 August 2014 
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support. Those opposing the project, which is going to change the face of Masvingo are 
witches” (ibid). One ZANU PF official even said those opposed to the project must be 
beaten. Dzikami Mavhaire, the ZANU PF minister who succeeded Mr Mangoma as Energy 
Minister after the inclusive government said  “We do not have to waste time; those who want 
to scuttle this project should be beaten up, even using 'dry hands'”. (ibid) This was because 
ZANU PF’s close association with Rautenbach influenced any issues related to his 
investments and the vice versa with the MDCs.  
On the other hand, Minister Mangoma insisted that the whole Green Fuel project was more of 
ZANU PF corruption than anything else. He said 
Very fundamental setting of it the whole thing is based on ZANU PF corruption rather 
than on benefit for Zimbabwe to Zimbabweans and to everybody else. …… you have 
got people who are being driven by profit-motive and not the welfare of 
Zimbabweans that cannot be development (Mangoma interview with Maphosa, 2013). 
 
In view of this lack of public credibility and reported cases of corruption, parties lacked the 
requisite level of mutual trust and respect to reliably work out conflicts when they arose 
(Masunungure, 2009a). Cheeseman (2011: 34) argues that Zimbabwe’s power sharing was a 
classical case that demonstrated hardened partisan political identities that refused 
compromise and the prominence of hardline elements was driven by groups that were victims 
of violence and created physical and mental barriers to negotiate with the enemy. He further 
argued “such pernicious combination undermines the willingness of leaders to place their 
trust in political processes as the significance of personal ambitions renders it difficult to 
build smooth relations” (Cheeseman, 2011:340). The largest shareholder, Rautenbach himself 
was not seen as purely Zimbabwean enough by Minister Mangoma and that the project 
occupied vast tracks of land. He said: 
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Rautenbach is one of the unclear people in southern Africa. As the minister 
responsible for fuel, I am being treated as a common criminal by raising the illegality 
of Rautenbach’s operations yet I am not. How can one person be allowed to take land 
away from thousands of people when we are embarking on land reform for the 
landless majority? Since the MDC became part of the inclusive government, we now 
have no fuel problems. Green Fuels want to create a fuel problem (MDC Press 
Release, 05/09/2012).  
It was only in April 2014 that presidential Affairs Minister Didymus Mutasa admitted that the 
government does not know the value of the money used to construct the ethanol plant, but the 
project must be supported because it was being done by Rautenbach (Herald, 25/04/2014)4.  
According to Mazarire (2013: 107), Green Fuel is part of the patronage politics of ZANU PF 
that stretches its tentacles to incorporate former Rhodesian whites who forged alliances with 
ZANU PF to protect their interests from the growing wave of confiscation that began with the 
land occupations in the 2000s.  
As Minister Mangoma stood his ground, ZANU PF and its media mouth pieces especially the 
state media both broadcast and print in particular The Herald blamed Minister Mangoma for 
failing to come up with legislation for mandatory blending of fuel romping in self styled 
political analysts to besmirch the Energy Minister. The Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe 
(2009: 60) notes “the government media in Zimbabwe broadcast hate speech against anyone 
who opposes ZANU PFs’ programs and the intention of such messages is to systematically 
undermine and subjugate the identified victim using insulting and offensive language to 
publicly destroy the reputation of such individual to the extent that no sane or self respecting 
persons will support such deviant political persons”. Many editorial and opinion articles were 
written in state media’s daily newspaper The Herald criticising Mangoma’s stance on Green 
Fuel. For instance,  
As a nation, we are guilty of rewarding mediocrity; of allowing incompetent line 
ministers play poker with the country’s economic and energy well-being. We now 
know all too well what the Honourable Energy and Power Development Minister Mr 
4 Mutasa speaks on Chisumbanje Ethanol Plant, Herald, 25 April 2014 
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Elton Mangoma is planning to do with our precious ethanol liquid from Chisumbanje. 
He plans a spectacular dishonour of the country by encouraging exports, to import 
same later, when Zimbabwe's own fuel needs are barely met. Green Fuel is now stuck 
with several millions of litres of unsold ethanol because of lack of supporting 
legislation (The Herald, 07/05/2012).  
Energy Minister Mangoma stood his ground and the much-hyped US$600 million ethanol 
plant became a white elephant as machines at the multi-million-dollar project ground to a halt 
and the company running the venture was stuck with millions of litres of fuel5. The project 
that was touted as a panacea to the country’s US$73, 1 million annual fuel import bill, 
teetered to the brink of collapse amid divisions in the country’s divided power sharing 
government because the Energy Minister was a “policy dictator” within a jurisdiction who 
had the capacity block policy changes emanating from a colleague ministry of another 
political party (Schermann & Enner-Jedenastrik, 2013:5). The workers who were employed 
lost their jobs, “milled around the plant around idly, drinking beer, annoying their wives, 
waiting for the chance to get back to work” (Sapp, 2013).  
Some media reports indicated that about 5000 people lost their jobs as a result of Minister 
Mangoma refusing to allow for mandatory blending. However, Mangoma always denied such 
facts arguing that this must be reflected in pension’s contributions to the National Social 
Security Council and his fellow MDC-T Minister who was Minister of Labour and Social 
Welfare did not verify the veracity of such facts. He said 
When they bring in those numbers, they are way, way, way exaggerated and therefore 
when you begin to push the falsehoods then some people begin to question why are 
you doing that? Why can you not use the proper facts? Either give us a NSSA return 
which would show how many you are putting in and they failed to do so. Or give us a 
clear PAYE return and they’ve failed to do so and clearly when you go there, you’ll 
see that the place doesn’t employ that many people (Mangoma interview with 
Chikanza, 2013). 
5 Zindi, E The sad tale of Chisumanje ethanol plant , The Herald, 30 March 2012 
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3.6 Evils of Green Fuel 
Green Fuel may have raised hope of rural villages in terms of raising their livelihoods by 
providing employment and the much needed United States dollars in a country that suffered 
from severe liquidity crunch following its adoption at the start of the inclusive government. 
However, it was contrary to their expectations and left them in pain more than the political 
battleground on mandatory blending. At the core of Green Fuel were silent issues that were 
being ignored by those who advocated for mandatory blending which were some of the main 
reasons behind Mangoma’s refusal to grant mandatory blending. 
 The project was financed by Rautenbach, a close associate of ZANU PF well known for 
financing the party through proceeds from his mining ventures in return for certain favours. 
The people in the area of the Green Fuel project is situated had always voted against ZANU 
PF since Zimbabwe attained independence from 1980 (Thondhlana, 2014: 10). In the view of 
Mangoma, ZANU PF punished MDC supporters in signing the multimillion ethanol project 
deal as it dispossessed some communities from their land. Mr Mangoma opposed to the 
project as a whole for the fundamental reason the land that acquired for the mega project 
displaced many people. This was the main basis of Mangoma denial of authorizing 
mandatory blending of fuel. Mangoma said:  
It is the rights of the people of Chisumbanje because the villagers are being displaced. 
You cannot have progress that displaces indigenous people, you cannot have a white 
person taking over land owned by blacks in a country particularly with a party that 
says land must be taken from the whites and be given to the blacks. But its okay for 
[sic] to kick out blacks and give it to Rautenbach that’s what the papers must be 
talking about. Right now the people of Chisumbanje are being subjected to serious 
terrorism there but the government (sic) so that a white person benefits from their 
misery while the project all its goodness and its badness has to address how 
Zimbabweans must feel like Zimbabweans in their own country (Mangoma interview 
Chikanza, 2013).  
From February 2000, mass land occupation began in Zimbabwe when the ZANU PF regime 
engaged in a fast track land reform program taking land from white commercial farmers as a 
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form of economic indigenization and black empowerment (Moyo and Yeros, 2005: 165). The 
land invasions were part of a longer history on anti-imperialist and pan-African struggles, 
casting anyone opposed to the land reform as surrogates of the whites and enemies of the 
nation (Raftopoulous, 2009: 213). The academic debate on land reform in Zimbabwe is a 
long one and it is still going. It is divided between two camps, the civic nationalists and the 
‘indegenisationists’ including both liberals and self proclaimed Marxists, but both producing 
the categories of bourgeoisie social science (Moyo and Yeros, 2005:193). The basis of the 
2000 land reform made Minister Mangoma oppose the Green Fuel project in its entirety 
especially on dispossessing communities off their land. Minister Mangoma said 
We went to war in order to take the land but now we are being forced off that land. In 
a free Zimbabwe where the liberation war was fought on the basis of land, where we 
have seen a messy and wrong but messy implementation of land reform where land 
was being taken from the few whites to the majority black. It is callous and heartless. 
I am prepared to go on a one man crusade in order to protect the poor. Rautenbach’s 
project must make peace with the villagers. Zanu PF and Billy have gone beyond and 
have taken over communal land. Now here we have got a situation where a few 
ZANU PF people, nicodemously are now empowering a white person to remove the 
black people from their land, from their land and nobody talks about it and nobody 
thinks it’s an issue (Mangoma interview with Chikanza, 2013).  
The community in the Chisumbanje area did not just lose their land, some of them lost their 
livestock. It is said that their cattle were slaughtered and some were injured and some were 
victims of poisoned or polluted water (Parliamentary Hansard, 20/02/2013). The box below 
shows how some families were displaced through the Green Fuel project.  
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3.7 Mutambara report on Chisumbanje Ethanol Project 
 As a result of competing political interests, Cabinet later on agreed to set up an inter- 
ministerial committee to look on issues around the bio-fuel project. The Committee was led 
by Deputy Prime Minister Professor Arthur Mutambara. Before the final report came out, 
Mutambara told the National Assembly some of his first damning observations around the 
way the project was done in a question and answer session on 20 February 2012. He said the 
management at Green Fuel and the District Administrator were operating under the influence 
of some political warlords, God fathers and political grandmasters. In other words, the 
political grandmasters were ZANU PF and at one time Vice President Joyce Mujuru (ZANU 
PF) said President Mugabe must invoke presidential powers to enable consumption of 
ethanol. Deputy Prime Minister Mutambara said that the company and the police connived 
together to behave in a criminal fashion to harass and arrest villagers on behalf of the 
investor. He also said that the company’s behaviour was typical to the Rhodesian era during 
of colonial conquest in Zimbabwe in the 1890s as the company killed cattle, slashed crops 
down and villagers injured (Parliamentary Hansard, 20/02/2013).  
CHISUMBANJE — About 300 000 families could be displaced in Chisumbanje if a 
company that is setting up an Ethanol Plant, Macdom, goes ahead with its plans to acquire 
40 000 hectares of land in the area. Macdom is leasing the land from State-owned Arda. 
Spokesperson for the affected villagers, Gwenzi Wedzerai, told NewsDay the firm had 
started growing sugarcane on 5 112 hectares and had indicated it would want to acquire 
more land so as to meet its target of 80 000 kilolitres of Ethanol per day.“We thought this 
project was going to bring relief to the people of Chisumbanje but it’s actually displacing 
them,” said Wedzerai. He added 83 families from Rimayi and Chinyamukwakwa villages 
had been forced to relocate to neighbouring Mozambique after the company encroached 
into communal plots and ploughed down their crops. “The only people that have received 
compensation are war veterans who got $600 and they are using these people to 
intimidate villagers opposed to the project,” said Wedzerai. The villagers also alleged 
they were struggling to raise penalties for their livestock which stray into the sugarcane 
plantations. The company allegedly demanded $20 per head and villagers claimed they 
ended up selling some of them to pay the fine. “Villagers are being forced to sell some of 
their livestock for them to be able to pay the penalty,” said Wedzerai,  adding they had 
presented their grievances to Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, who had promised to 
look into the issue. Source: Newsday: 27/07/2011 
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In his inter ministerial report, Professor Mutambara (2012) noted that 1754 households were 
displaced from their communal lands in Chisumbanje (1060) and Chinyamukwakwa (694) 
communal lands, only 516 have been resettled. He urged an asset audit on land, livestock, 
crops, buildings, equipment and family size for each displaced household to be conducted so 
that the compensation and resettlement was meaningful. The report also noted that a total of 
US$80 500.00 was due to these households according to the combined reports from Agritex, 
traditional leaders and the victims, displaced communities indicate that livestock was lost 
through being shot, drinking contaminated water, or by the levying of undue and oppressive 
fees for trespassing. The report noted that a total compensation of US$20 000.00 be advanced 
to the affected communities, victims of violence, contaminated water, and unsafe working 
conditions.  
The report urged Green Fuel to take cognizance of the fact that households will have 
livestock and mechanisms of coexistence with this reality must be put in place. The report 
also observed the company only employed 34% of local people which was unacceptable and 
urged the company strive to raise its overall local employment equity. In emphasised that all 
the low skill jobs must go to locals. It called for a balance in resolution of this grievance with 
a desire to promote national cohesion and integration. For mandatory blending to be done, the 
report noted that the project must become a joint venture with the Government of Zimbabwe 
and not with ARDA. For this to be done, the veracity of the claim that US$600m that had 
been invested needed to be established, including the source of the financing. There must be 
robust and creative valuation of the State’s asset contributions to the Project, such as the land 
(40 000ha), equipment, intellectual property, institutional memory, other state assets usable 
as security for loans, the partnership with government as an asset, and value enhancing 
instruments such as mandatory blending (Mutambara, 2012)  
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3.8 Summary 
Green Fuel is a large scale ethanol producing factory in Sub Saharan Africa that 
manufactures anhydrous ethanol from sugar cane to supply Zimbabwe and the region, with a 
clean, efficient and renewable fuel source. It is a joint venture between the quasi-government 
parastatal Agricultural Research and Development Authority (ARDA) which is under the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Its main funder is Mr Billy Rautenbach who was put on the targeted 
sanctions list by the United States because he supports Mugabe's ZANU PF party to engage 
in human rights abuses via proceeds from his mining projects. Simpson and Westbrock 
(2014) notes that Rautenbach helped the ZANU PF regime buy government buy 642 vehicles 
with his company just before the run off of June 2008. They were 
mostly Isuzu pickups, Toyota SUVs, and minivans at US$65,000 each in cash per truck. 
These cars were used during the presidential runoff that saw many MDC supporters lose life, 
property while other were displaced and injured in state sponsored violence. 
Green Fuel aim of selling ethanol suffered a setback as the Minister of Energy and Power 
Development, Elton Mangoma ruled out mandatory blending of petrol which made Green 
Fuel to hold onto 10 million litres of ethanol primarily because the project was done without 
his consultation whilst the MDC was already in the inclusive government and to him this was 
tantamount to nullifying the inclusive government. Minister Mangoma also argued that he 
could not make legislation for individuals since the project was for Rautenbach and the 
Ministry of Agriculture through ARDA and not with the Government of Zimbabwe. Minister 
Mangoma considered Green Fuel as part of ZANU PF habit of running policies that had not 
been approved by cabinet.  
More so, ZANU PF relationship with Rautenbach influenced its position on Green Fuel while 
MDC as victims of Rautenbach sponsored abuses influenced its position. Green Fuel was part 
of ZANU PF corruption and the largest shareholder, Rautenbach himself was not seen as 
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purely Zimbabwean enough by Minister Mangoma. Moreover, the project occupied vast 
tracks of land and the land was acquired for this mega project displaced many people in an 
area where the people who have lived there had never voted for ZANU PF since 
independence in 1980. Green Fuel had its own evils as the company behaved in a criminal 
fashion in harassing and arresting villagers and the company is said to have killed cattle, 
slashed crops of villagers down which made Mangoma refuse to allow for mandatory 
blending of fuel. Soon after the expiry of the inclusive government, mandatory blending was 
enforced after ZANU PF won the July 31 elections.  
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4 Chapter 4 Restructuring of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the restructuring of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company. I first give 
a historical overview of ZISCO explaining its importance to the country of Zimbabwe; an 
over view of ZISCO’s collapse in the 2000s; the restructuring process, and the discussion of 
challenges that made ZISCO fail to resume its operations after the ministry of Mines and 
Mining Development refused to transfer mineral rights to the winner of the bidding of 
ZISCO. The restructuring was spearheaded by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce as the 
ministry with jurisdiction over industry, which was headed by Professor Welshman Ncube of 
the MDC-M party and the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development was headed by Obert 
Mpofu (ZANU PF).  
Even though the whole of cabinet might have agreed to partially sell ZISCO, I will explain 
why   public administration is so complex that that any decision taken by cabinet needs the 
expertise and cooperation of a certain government department to be implemented (Laver and 
Shepsle, 1996:13). As it stands, ZISCO is expected to resume operations in 2016 (Daily 
News, 02/08/2014)6. 
4.2 Historical overview of ZISCO 
The colonial government established ZISCO as a wholly owned government entity as the 
Rhodesian Iron and Steel Commission (RISCOM) in 1942 to take all iron and limestone 
deposits in Redcliff (Kaliyati, 1991:4). Production at RISCOM started in 1948 and by 1965, 
RISCOM employed around 2900 people. As a result of the United Nations economic 
sanctions imposed on the Smith regime, RISCOM went through major renovations and major 
investments were done on it between 1965 and 1972 as a sanction busting measure (ibid).  
6 Zisco to resume operation in 2016, Daily News, 02 August 2014 
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After independence in 1980, it was renamed Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company and by 1990 
employed about 5500 people and indirect employment created by the very existence of 
ZISCO was around 50 000 (Kaliyati, 1991). ZISCO played an important role as a foreign 
currency earner as 80% of its products were for export and as generator of employment. 
Kaliyati (1991) noted that ZISCO was the largest and only integrated iron and steel plant in 
Africa south of the Equator excluding South Africa which had Ancellor Mittal as the only big 
firm after ZISCO. The plant had the capacity to produce one million tons of steel per annum, 
but routine stoppages and breakdowns for servicing meant the plant produced an average of 
800 000 tons per year (Kaliyati, 1991). ZISCO was an entity of strategic importance in 
Zimbabwe given that there were a number of small and large firms that were dependent on 
products from ZISCO including RESCO which refurbishes the railways of Zimbabwe while 
it supplied many other big firms with steel products (Kaliyati, 1991).  
4.3 Decline of ZISCO 
The reasons for the decline of ZISCO are not very clear, but corruption by the government 
elites is said to be one of the main reasons. From 2000, ZISCO operated without a fully 
constituted board and its blast furnaces were no longer functional while its plants and 
equipment were dilapidated following a decade of no funding (Zhou, 2012:181). In 2006, a 
National Economic Conduct Inspectorate report noted looting of ZISCO steel by Mugabe’s 
vice presidents, ministers and parliamentarians in conjunction with ZISCO managing director 
and marketing executives (Muleya, 2006). The report noted that ZISCO finances were raided 
through questionable contracts and string of payments covering controversial purchases, 
services, airfares, hotel bookings, director’s fees, management expenses and entertainment 
allowances.  
Ministers pointed out were Indigenisation and Empowerment minister Samuel 
Mumbengegwi, Science and Technology minister Olivia Muchena and Small-to-Medium 
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Enterprises Development minister Sithembiso Nyoni, among others, who had allowances and 
air tickets paid for them by ZISCO while on missions that had nothing to do with the 
parastatal. Higher Education minister Stan Mudenge and the late Zanu PF MP Gibson 
Munyoro were hosted by ZISCO subsidiaries in Botswana under unclear circumstances. 
More so, former Zanu PF MP Tirivanhu Mudariki benefited through hotel bookings done for 
him using public resources. Mumbengegwi who was at the time Industry and International 
Trade minister in charge of ZISCO was paid by the state-owned steel giant’s Botswana 
subsidiary a US$3 000 allowances while he was attending a SADC meeting in Gaborone on 
July 17 2003. There were also many questionable payments that ZISCO made to South 
African companies R1,6 million payment to Macsteel in 2004 for technical services and  
more than R470 000 paid to Chartwell Capital Group to restructure its balance sheet and debt 
profile (Muleya, 2006). By 2010, what was once one of Africa's largest integrated steelworks 
was a mass of antiquated machinery and could hardly pay its depleted workforce. The 
steelworks, which propped up Rhodesia's economy when it was buffeted by United Nations 
sanctions, could hardly barely pay its depleted workforce, largely consisting of manual staff, 
after sustained losses and gross abuse of resources by politicians who received allowances 
and airline tickets for business unrelated to the parastatal (Muleya, 2011). 
4.4 The restructuring process 
ZISCO restructuring went through a tender process in a cabinet that included all ministers in 
government, the President , Vice President, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Ministers, 
including Professor Ncube  for Industry and Commerce and Obert Mpofu for Mines and 
Mining Development. According to Unganai (2013), as per normal government tendering 
practice, technocrats were directed, Permanent Secretaries and staff in the ministries 
concerned together with ZISCO management to draw up specifications, float tenders, invite 
bids from prospective investors, adjudicate the offers and recommend to cabinet on who to 
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award the contract. The selection criteria outlined in the bidder evaluation form included the 
debt takeover plan, financial capacity, technical ability, how much government was going to 
get for its shareholding and issues of safety, health and environment. ZISCO’s debt was 
critical because the whole point of selling ZISCO shareholding was necessitated by 
government’s failure to pay its liabilities. ZISCO had two major debts, one to a Chinese bank 
and the other debt involved a US$240 million from a German bank and any new investor had 
to make a commitment to liquidate this debt. This debt caused some government properties in 
Botswana and South Africa to be attached (The Standard, 20/05/2010)7. The investor also 
had to put in US$65 million for refurbishment of blast furnaces four and three and the coke 
oven. In addition to all this, the investor was supposed to be in a position to pay for 
government shares when the government divests (The Standard, 28/10/2010)8 
 
In the initial bid, 12 companies expressed their interest, most of them international 
companies. These were Jindal Steel, Sino Zimbabwe, Essar Africa Holdings Limited, 
Sovereignty Capital, ArcelorMittal, China Metallurgical Group Corporation, Arcadia Steel 
Energy and Mining, Apollo Steel, Zimlantic Export & Import (Pvt) Ltd, Posco, AMC 
Corporation and Murray & Roberts. The government rejected bids from ArcelorMittal South 
Africa, a unit of Lakshmi Mittal's ArcelorMittal, and Jindal Steel & Power of India, which 
had partnered with a local consortium, Gateway Zimbabwe that had roped in South Africa's 
Industrial Development Corporation and the Development Bank of South Africa for capacity. 
Cabinet rejected these two bids because President Mugabe indicated that he did not want 
ZISCO to be taken over by big conglomerates as such big companies might be too powerful 
to control and that they could kill competition and manipulate the steel and iron market 
(Muleya, 2011).  
7 ZISCO debt: Zimbabwe properties face auction, the Standard 20/05/2010 
8 Principals to decide on ZISCO fate, The standard 28/10/2010  
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The Standard (2010) notes that the initial bidding did not produce an outright winner partly 
because of political interference and preferences and failure by companies to commit 
themselves to taking over government’s debt to KWV of Germany, Eximbank and Sinosure 
of China. It also notes that most of the big companies involved in the bidding process had 
political heavyweights behind them which made the whole process fraught with political 
meddling and behind the scenes lobbying and in the end ArcelorMittal dropped out due to 
several reasons including political pressures. On the debt issue, Sino Zimbabwe had simply 
offered to negotiate without making a clear commitment to liquidate the debt.  
In August 2010, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce then re-issued the tender. One of the 
tender requirements was for bidders to make a down payment of US$87 million for 
immediate working capital into ZISCO and bids whose submissions varied from government 
specifications were disqualified (Unganai, 2013). In November 2010, Essar Africa Holdings 
Limited emerged as a winner as its accounts showed it had a balance sheet size of US$3,4 
billion and a gearing ratio of 23%. Given that the gearing ratio is generally a measure of a 
company’s exposure to debt obligations, EAHL demonstrated a greater capacity to borrow or 
raise capital compared to the others. On the technical side, Sino Zimbabwe was knocked out 
because it did not have any experience in the steel industry, despite that it had China 
Shougang as its technical partner. However, Sino Zimbabwe did not produce any 
documentation showing it had a contract with China Shougang to work together (The 
Standard, 02/12/2010).  
EAHL also  emerged as the best in terms of the US $750 million it offered government, the 
taking over of ZISCO debts and their value addition proposition, support of offshore and 
integrated industries and social responsibility commitments (Unganai, 2013). EAHL 
presented a comprehensive and detailed turnaround programme with specific milestones and 
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beefed up its strategic and turnaround plans with targets to generate electrical power, 
construct a new bar and rod mill, as well as a new coke oven battery to enhance production 
and viability of ZISCO. EAHL produced plans to build ferro-alloys production plants, key 
components in producing stainless steel which fetches a premium price of at least US$10 000 
per tonne compared to long products’ average price of US$800 per tonne and flat products 
that are US$2000 per tonne. The ZISCO transaction was going to serve as a catalyst for 
significant future foreign direct investment into Zimbabwe inclusive government (The 
Herald, 10/03/2011).   
4.5 The Final Deal 
The deal was finalized in August 2011 as EAHL outwitted steel-making giants such as 
Jindhal Steel and Power of India, Arcelor Mittal of South Africa, Murray & Roberts and 
Reclamation (SA), Steel Makers Zimbabwe and the Gateway Consortium. ZISCO was 
renamed NewZim Steel (The Herald, 08/02/2011). The agreed restructuring framework 
provided for a share ownership structure of 54: 35:11 percent for EAHL, the Government of 
Zimbabwe and minority shareholders respectively. In addition, EAHL was required to inject 
an initial amount of $US 750 million in fresh capital towards the revival of ZISCO.  EAHL 
was going to take over the Government of Zimbabwe's ZISCO related (internal and external) 
debt obligations amounting to approximately US $340 million (Parliamentary Hansard, 
04/09/2012). This was presented by Minister Ncube to cabinet where all the ministers, Prime 
Minister and President Mugabe and they all agreed that this was the best deal on the table, 
and the deal was then signed between  and Ncube on behalf of Government, and later 
approved by the President (Unganai, 2013).  
In terms of the agreement, the Government of Zimbabwe was set to benefit from the 
resumption of operations at the steel plant, which would provide raw materials for the local 
manufacturing industry. About three thousand jobs of the employees at ZISCO were to be 
54 
 
 
 
 
 
saved and the benefits would cascade to the families of the employees (Parliamentary 
Hansard, 04/09/2012). The major shareholders, EAHL and the Government of Zimbabwe 
were to ensure that workers were paid their dues (Parliamentary Hansard, 04/09/2012). The 
Government of Zimbabwe and EAHL reached an agreement on the beneficiation of the low 
quality, vast iron ore (less than 50% iron content) reserves in the country.  EAHL intended to 
bring a small number of experts into Zimbabwe to train staff in the initial stages of operations 
and would to a large extent make use of local skills (Parliamentary Hansard, 04/09/2012).  
The parties created another mineral holding subsidiary called NewZim Minerals in which the 
Government of Zimbabwe holds a 20 percent stake and the rest in the hands of EAHL 
(Parliamentary Hansard, 04/09/2012).  This is where the problems emerged from that caused 
serious friction and consternation in government.  It was only at the point of implementation 
of this part of agreement that issues about ZISCO ownership of mineral claims of Buchwa, 
Mwanesi, Ripple Creek and Bimco iron ore reserves started to emerge and caused friction. 
This was an issue that moved beyond the GNU without being resolved.   
The deal was blessed by President Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and an 
inauguration took place on 3 August 2011 at the ZISCO premises in Redcliff. The event was 
superintended by the President , the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers, 
Deputy Ministers, Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, Members of Parliament from Midlands 
region, members of Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Mines and Industry, leaders of 
Apex organizations’, commissioners of public service, heads of parastatals, ZISCO board 
members, community leaders, ZISCO employees, EAHL management, community leaders, 
Mayor of Kwekwe, Mayor of Redcliff, traditional chiefs, provincial administrators and 
regional officers.  
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This is what makes this case interesting to analyse and this is the foundation for the other 
argument of this paper that “A program is more likely to reach its intended end if the cabinet 
minister who controls the corresponding ministerial portfolio is in agreement with the 
position taken by cabinet as a collective”. On the relaunch, President Mugabe, said the 
rejuvenation of the giant steel company demonstrated the confidence that investors have in 
Zimbabwe. He said:  
We have today a demonstration of confidence in Zimbabwe by a major international 
company of repute. On behalf of Government and the people of Zimbabwe, I wish to 
express my gratitude to Essar Holdings for coming to partner with us in this strategic 
sector of our economy. This investment bodes well for both the iron and steel industry 
and the generality of industry at the local and regional level. Government therefore 
fully endorses and supports this project and will continue to render all necessary 
facilitation for the successful implementation of this great partnership (The Herald, 
04/08/2011).   
Newspaper editorial opinions and commentaries from government officials praised the deal 
as the rebirth of ZISCO was seen at a catalyst to economic growth, job creation and 
development of critical infrastructure such as roads, schools and hospitals in a city that had 
lost its lustre when ZISCO went down. This was the feeling considering that ZISCO was the 
biggest firm in the Midlands Province while other firms in neighbouring towns such as Steel 
Makers Zimbabwe, Zim Plow, Lancashire Steel and Sable Chemicals, were to an extent 
depended on ZISCO which supplied them with steel products and oxygen.  Since the 
European Union and the United States imposed targeted measures on Zimbabwe from the 
early 2000 for electoral malpractices and human rights abuses, the ZISCO deal was the 
largest foreign direct investment since 2002.  
4.6 What went wrong? 
Without a very long period of time details started to emerge that the ZISCO restructuring 
process had sown seeds of conflict between two ministries, the Ministry of Industry and the 
Ministry of Mines and these ministries were controlled by ministers belonging to different 
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political parties. This conflict in the power sharing governments was caused by “differential 
preferences” and a certain outcome that not all cabinet ministers were in agreement over the 
particular form of action taken (Dowding, 1990:50).  
The critical thing in the resumption of ZISCO operation was the transfer of mineral rights to 
EAHL and the Minister of Mines refused to transfer them.  According to Hood (2005: 19-20), 
the reason why coordination is important as governments programs can only be achieved 
through some coordination of some kind to move towards a certain end since 
“implementation is the ability to achieve the predicted consequences of a policy” (Pressman 
and Wildavsky, 1973).   When the differences started to emerge, the Prime Minister Morgan 
Tsvangirai expressed his frustration by saying: 
The Essar project has to proceed and the debate over mining concessions should now 
be a thing of the past. Cabinet has made a decision and to continue to stall will affect 
the project. We signed up to the deal with all its conditions and all we expect is for 
work to begin at Essar and after two years of dillydallying we must thank Essar for 
being very patient and remaining focused on this project but I must say patience has its 
limits and should anything affect this project the Zimbabwean government is to blame 
(Daily News, 31/08/2012). 
4.7 Report by the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Industry and Commerce 
 The real challenges that existed in the restructuring of ZISCO became clear in evidence 
presented by the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Industry and Commerce here in after 
referred to as Committee which reported to the National Assembly on 04 September 2012. 
The Committee did an inquiry conduct given the concerned about the delay in the resumption 
of operations at this strategic entity in the revival of the country's economy (Parliamentary 
Hansard, 04/09/2012).  
The Committee had interviews with the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the Ministry of 
Mines and Mining Development and workers representatives of ZISCO. The Minister of 
Industry and Commerce informed the Committee that the Ministry of Mines and Mining 
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Development had not transferred the Buchwa Mine, Ripple Creek and Mwanezi iron ore 
mining rights to EAHL as at 28 May 2012. The presentation noted that the Minister of Mines 
was the major delaying factor to the conclusion of the agreement and the reason behind the 
salary freeze for the New Zimbabwe Steel Limited workers. The delay was despite the fact 
that  first official communication by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce to the Ministry 
of Mines and Mining Development over the transfer of the mining claims took place on the 
6th of June 2011 before the President presided over the handover ceremony (Parliamentary 
Hansard, 04/09/2012).  
Professor Welshman Ncube also informed the Committee that the delay in finalizing the 
ZISCO and  EAHL deal was worrying ZISCO Germany and Chinese creditors who should 
have started receiving their payments had the deal been implemented as agreed. Ncube told 
the Committee that under the deal, EAHL was supposed to settle Ziscosteel’s $400 million 
debt to KFW Bank of Germany and Sinosure of China but has not yet been done 
(Parliamentary Hansard, 04/09/2012). The Minister of Industry and Commerce reported that 
Cabinet had resolved that the Minister of Mines and Mining Development should transfer the 
Buchwa, Ripple Creek and the twenty, undisputed Mwanesi mining claims to EAHL.  
On the other hand, Minister Obert Mpofu told the Committee that his Ministry of Mines and 
Mining Development knew nothing about the ZISCO deal and was excluded from the 
negotiation process of the agreement. This was quite interesting given that Minister Mpofu 
was the former Industry and International Trade Minister when the idea of restructuring 
ZISCO was first conceived before the formation of the inclusive government in 2006. 
Minister Mpofu even told Voice of America Zimbabwe in an interview that Cabinet had not 
discussed the deal prior to signing, adding Industry Minister Welshman Ncube brought the 
papers to their weekly meeting "as an afterthought a few months down the line when they 
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discovered there were other issues to deal with our mineral resources” (Voice of America 
Zimbabwe, 2012). However, this is high sounding nothing in that the restructuring was 
concluded by cabinet and cabinet sits every Tuesday chaired by Mugabe who is President of 
the country and the party which Mpofu belonged to.  
Minister Mpofu’s remarks highlights the depth of the lack of coordination that existed in the 
power sharing government as “executive government structures at their summit should have 
at least some units and procedures that are designed to bring the parts together in some way 
and a Cabinet meeting is one of them” (Hood, 2005:19). In public administration, it is 
assumed that the cabinet is the core of the government with “structures which primarily serve 
to pull together and integrate central government policies, or act as final arbiters within the 
executive of conflicts between different elements of the government machine” (Dunleavy and 
Rhodes, 1990: 3). More so, Professor Ncube regularly had media briefings and press 
conferences on the progress made towards concluding the agreement from November 2010 
until August 2011. Minister Mpofu should have told his political master, Robert Mugabe who 
inaugurated over the handover ceremony his differences. More importantly, the agreement 
was sent to the Attorney General’s Office-the government’s highest legal office in March 
2011 to review any irregularities 
The Committees report concluded that there were differences in the presentations made by 
the Minister of Industry and Commerce and the Minister of Mines and Mining Development 
on the iron content of the Buchwa, Ripple Creek and Mwanezi claims. The Committee also 
concluded that ZISCO was sitting 13 million tons of iron ore and a tonne of unprocessed iron 
ore fetches no less than US$140 per tonnne which means the government short-changed itself 
in the deal. It recommended that the deal be revisited for the best interests of Zimbabwe.  
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4.8 Discussion of coordination challenges on ZISCO restructuring  
There were many coordination problems in the way the restructuring of ZISCO was done. 
First was the issue that Minister Obert Mpofu said that his Ministry of Mines and Mining 
Development was excluded from the negotiation process of the agreement and the 
inauguration ceremony of the New Zimbabwe Steel Limited. This way in which the ZISCO 
deal was handled makes it quite misleading to treat Ministers Ncube and Mpofu as people 
who belonged to the same cabinet that sat together every Tuesday chaired by President 
Mugabe.  ZISCO was put to tender from 2010 and the specifications were there but the 
Ministry of Mines chose to keep quiet. It is also imperative to note that Obert Mpofu was the 
Minister of Industry and International Trade prior to the GNU and that is when the idea to 
restructure ZISCO first started. Peters (2006:297) argues that organisations and departments 
cognisant of each other’s jurisdiction make good efforts to engage in multiple exchanges and 
interaction which reduces the efficacy of the vertical stovepipes of government. In his 
defence, Minister Ncube said 
The Cabinet meet every time on Tuesdays, they have been discussing this deal and I 
do not think there is any ministry which did not know about the deal. I do not think 
the Head of State was going to ZISCO to officially open it without scrutinising the 
deal (Parliamentary Hansard, 04/09/2012).  
Laver and Shepsle (1996:30) argue that any decision taken by cabinet needs the expertise and 
cooperation of a certain government department to be implemented. It was the Minister of 
Mines, who as the political head of a major government department was person with formal 
jurisdiction on mineral resources.  This jurisdiction made him the veto player with power to 
block any the proposals from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce because they differed 
on policy preferences. The mine claims were issues under the ministerial discretion of the 
Ministry of Mines. After the presentation by the Portfolio Committee on Industry and 
Commerce, one Member of Parliament Mr Settlement Chikwinya said:   
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The [way in which the ESSAR deal was [handled] highlighted issues of poor 
corporate governance as exhibited by the various ministries or individuals from 
ministries as they [were] involved in this deal, [which] does not give credence to our 
nation. More glaringly it is more painful to those who have interest to Government 
proceedings that there is no inter ministerial communication within the Cabinet. What 
one ministry is doing, the other ministry does not do and does not know. The two or 
more ministries are supposed to be appending their signatures to one document at the 
end of the day. There is now inter-ministerial fighting where members of the same 
Cabinet will be sitting, one wonders when the President is chairing and they are 
talking of the ESSAR deal. Is it the fact that other Ministries are in the same Cabinet 
or otherwise? (Parliamentary Hansard, 04/09/2012).  
Therefore, the inclusion of many political parties in the inclusive government did not lead to 
moderated and nuanced policies, discouraging insular thinking and stimulating vigorous 
debate as argued by Halperin etal (2005). The ministries controlled by different political 
parties operated in vertical silos with one department not knowing what the other department 
was doing. As one parliamentarian Mr Bednock Nyaude (MP) said 
In this deal, what you really see Madam Speaker, is the lack of a doctrine called 
animus contrahendi, which postulate that there shall be serious intentions which shall 
be expressed by each to the other by the negotiating parties without any vagueness. 
Madam Speaker, we are in a Government of National Unity and one thing that is 
alarming in this set up is the lack of operational congruency. Everyone wants to do 
what they want because there is the impunity that comes with the GNU. No one fires 
anybody. No one has got the power to fire anybody because if this deal was done in 
other circumstances other than the GNU, heads should have rolled. You look also at 
the Ministry of Mines, one wonders why they kept on ball watching, fence sitting 
when they know this Bill at some point in time came into the public domain, went out 
of the public domain, appeared in public domain and went out of public domain. They 
kept quiet until the last minute and they wanted to embargo the whole deal. This 
shows the lack of being at one I will urge the players in the GNU for the remainder of 
the GNU life to be able to practice the doctrine of id idem, to be at one. We have 
today between ESSAR, ZISCO Steel and the Ministry is a deal that benefits ESSAR 
and no one else. It is a deal that is fraught with irregularities (Parliamentary Hansard, 
04/09/2012).  
The major question that remains unanswered is why the Ministry of Mines remained quiet 
over such vital piece of information waiting to embargo the deal later on. This raises many 
unanswered questions. Unganai (2013) argues that if the Ministry of Mines or ZISCO and 
their parent ministry knew the value of the iron ore deposits and decided to keep quiet during 
the tender process, then this was a stitch up on their part. If no one was aware of such a vital 
61 
 
 
 
 
 
piece of information, then all ministries should shoulder the blame but more of it would fall 
on Obert Mpofu and his ministry as this was their technical contribution to drawing up the 
specifications. 
LeVan (2011: 39) argues power sharing government create dual sovereignty as the elites act 
as if they belong to separate governments and this was the case here. Scherman & Enner-
Jedenastik (2013:2) also argue that whenever parties join together to form a government, 
there will be areas of substantial disagreements as they do not work together.  Even though 
they sat in the same cabinet every Tuesday, there was no coordination amongst them. As Mr 
Madzimure (MP) said 
When the two ministers appeared before the Committee, the Minister of Mines was 
emphatic that he was not part to the deal. What surprised the committee more was that 
the Minister of Mines is also a Cabinet Minister who sits in Cabinet and some of the 
issues we were told were discussed in Cabinet (Parliamentary Hansard, 04/09/2012).  
4.9    ‘When lions fight, the grass suffers’  
Following the conclusion of the deal, EAHL granted a US$ 6 million advance for workers' 
salaries to ZISCO from May to October 2011 and suspended the salaries due to speculation 
and uncertainty over the Government's position on the agreement (Parliamentary Hansard, 
04/09/2012). Whilst Ministry of Industry and Commerce and the Ministry of Mines engaged 
in turf wars and blaming each other, the workers were the major victims. The White paper on 
managing the British government cross cutting issues noted that policy making was expected 
to be inter alia, strategic holistic, focused on outcomes and delivery, evidence based, 
inclusive, taking into account the affected groups and having clearly defined objectives 
(Cabinet Office, 2000). This was something that lacked in Zimbabwe’s power sharing 
government on ZISCO. 
The workers told the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Industry and Commerce that the 
suspension of salaries had negative effects which included the failure of employees to pay 
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school fees for children, provide for their families and pay back borrowed loans. They also 
told the Committee that their children who were in Grade Seven in 2011 failed to proceed to 
secondary school after schools withheld results insisting on parents settling outstanding fees 
first. Furthermore, the community could no longer access the water and electricity which 
could be accessed when the plant was operational. Since they were not working, pension 
benefits and the life group cover of the employees were no longer paid (Parliamentary 
Hansard, 04/09/2012).   
As the lack of coordination continued, ZISCO workers continued to suffer. Moyo, the ZISCO 
Joint Unions Chairman was quoted in the Worker of February 2013 saying death rate from 
chronic diseases was also growing at an alarming rate among ZISCO workers and their 
dependants. He said 
The rate of dying among workers and their dependants is too high. We have about 
five people dying every week. Some of these people have chronic illnesses, which 
require that they eat food before taking tablets. But where do they get the food when 
they are not being paid? This has forced them to take pills without eating anything. 
Some of them are dying because of hunger. Sometime in December two employees 
collapsed on their way to [part time] work [at the nearby farms] and when they were 
taken to hospital and it was discovered that it was because of hunger. One of them 
later died (The Worker, February 2013).  
As time went by, the welfare of the workers and their families continued to deteriorate more. 
The challenges that they faced were just immense. The negative consequence of the lack of 
ministerial coordination was the workers were the greatest victims. The situation was just 
appalling. As The Worker of February 2013 further reported:  
The situation is dire for pensioners and widows who have not been getting anything 
from the company. Hundreds of children failed to get Form One places as schools 
demanded result slips and fees deposits. Most of the workers have resorted to work as 
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farm labourers at nearby farms doing menial jobs while others are turning to gold 
panning.9 
4.10 Who was to blame 
Given all these challenges, one may ask, who was to blame? The political blame fallacy 
asserts that because something goes wrong, there must be somebody to blame (Dowding, 
1990). Thus people have a tendency to ask did Ncube and his Ministry muddle the deal. Is it 
the Ministry of Mines? A note received from ZISCO workers said that the team that 
negotiated the deal lacked expertise. It said that the team lacked technical know-how of the 
steel industry and comprised of the Minister (Ncube) who is a lawyer; Deputy Minister (Mike 
Bimha), who is experienced in social sciences; and a banker (Nyasha Makuvise) who is the 
chairman of ZISCO (Muleya, 2011). Unganai (2013) argues “major government projects 
such as the ESSAR deal are a team effort, cutting across, ministries and going up all the way 
up to the President. He notes that if there is any blame for the ‘botched’ ZISCO deal, then 
these are liable: ZISCO, the 3 Permanent Secretaries, Government Tender Board, Obert 
(Mines Minister), Guebuza (Parastatals Minister), Attorney General, Ncube (Industry and 
Commerce Minister), Prime Minister Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and President Robert Mugabe 
(ZANU PF).  
Deputy Prime Minister Professor Arthur Mutambara admitted in Parliament after being asked 
if the Cabinet as a whole did not know the value of iron ore claims that were subject to 
disputes. He said:  
The answer is very simple: guilty as charged! We were blind, deaf and dumb – that is 
the confession from Cabinet. We did not know better or we were just clumsy ... total n 
dereliction of duty. It is not the first time we had done this. We cannot charge EAHL 
for our ignorance and incompetence. It was as if the value is zero and yet back in India, 
EAHL listed their acquired asset in Zimbabwe as valued at over US$20 billion…The 
challenges we have had with ESSAR are that, in the discussion leading to the deal, 
9 The Worker February 2013 http://www.theworkerzimbabwe.com/worker/feb2013/feb.pdf accessed 24 July 
2014 
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there was never a conversation about the value of the iron ore which was involved and 
previously owned by BIMCO. In terms of the story is that the iron ore involved is to 
the tune of US$30 billion of asset and the investment from  is a maximum of US$700 
million………(Parliamentary Hansard 16/05/2012).  
He further argued that Zimbabwe’s mining laws were bad laws and laws governing natural 
resources in Africa were problematic. He said the challenges was a result that the discussion 
leading to the deal which never had a conversation about the value of the iron ore which was 
involved as if the value is zero and yet back in India, EAHL listed their acquired asset in 
Zimbabwe as valued at over US$20 billion (Parliamentry Hansard, 16/05/2012)  
The way in which the Government handled the welfare of the workers at ZISCO even made 
Japhet Madubeko, a ZANU PF legislator who once worked for ZISCO during the colonial 
period to praise the former colonial Smith regime. He said 
I worked at ZISCO during the Unilateral Declaration of Independence and Ian 
Smith’s used to visit us frequently at the company, telling us that we are the 
back bone of the economy and we had to keep on working hard to sustain the 
country. Now we wonder what is happening with our political leaders over 
ZISCO closure. We feel that the responsible ministers played the politics of 
ZANU PF and MDC at our expense (Daily News, 08/11/2013). 
Another ZANU PF MP, Matambanadzo asked Abigail Shonhiwa, the Permanent Secretary in 
the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, whether her portfolio was concerned with the 
welfare of the workers at Ziscosteel. Thus, the lack of coordination had “reduced the public 
respect for the management of the public sector” (Peters, 1998). He said 
We saw on TV several [8] cabinet ministers rushing to Hwange [National 
Park] to inspect the death of the elephants [from cyanide poisoning], but yet at 
Ziscosteel a lot people are dying every day because they are not getting any 
money for buying medication or because of hunger as they have not being 
paid for past five years. We have not seen any government minister or official 
at ZISCO. Does your ministry care about the welfare of workers at Zisco as 
over 2 00 workers have died within 36 months? (Daily News, 08/11/2013).  
The president’s office then took responsibility for the $750 million deal, but implementation 
remained bogged down by political bickering between the industry and mines ministries 
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(Voice of America Zimbabwe, 2014). Meanwhile during this time of uncertainty, NewZim 
Steel lost equipment worth millions of dollars at an auction to cover a debt accrued in a coal 
supply deal with Hwange Colliery Company to clear a debt of more than US$1,4 million. The 
ZISCO debt continues to balloon and Zimbabwe government had been involved in protracted 
legal battles with ZISCO creditors as some of them were impounding diamonds on sale in 
Antrwerp Belgium. 
4.11 Summary 
This chapter discussed that ZISCO restructuring entailed the partial sale of its share to the 
private sector. It went through a tendering process and 54% of shares were transferred from 
the state to EAHL and it was renamed New Zim Steel at a ceremony presided over by the 
head of state with most of the executive people in government present. The success of ZISCO 
restructuring was dependent on coordination between from separate but interdependent 
government ministries controlled by different political parties, the Ministry of Mines and 
Mining Development and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Unfortunately, the two 
ministers were just strange bed fellows in the same cabinet who did not communicate with 
each other and valuations were not done to the iron ore claims that ZISCO held in Buchwa, 
Bimco and Ripple Creek.  
While ZISCO was put on tender for nearly two years, the Ministry of Mines and Mining 
Development did not speak anything, later on to voice its concerns when the handover 
ceremony was done. What makes this case more interesting to analyse is that the Cabinet as a 
whole, the principals to the GPA and two ministers sat in the same cabinet meeting every 
Tuesday and none of them ever raised a concern for two years. Governments’ projects such 
as ZISCO restructuring are a team effort, cutting across, ministries and going up all the way 
up to the President. As said by Deputy Prime Minister Professor Mutambara, Cabinet agreed 
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on a deal that showed that the Cabinet was blind, deaf, and clumsy, displayed a total 
dereliction of duty, showing ignorance and incompetence as EAHL listed the property it has 
acquired for US$20 billion back in India. The role of the Attorney General’s office in 
scrutinizing becomes questionable as it was unable to see the irregularity that minerals were 
not valuated as part of the agreement. It is now four years after the ink on the papers on 
which the deals where signed at a ceremony presided over by President Mugabe, but nothing 
only except the name of the company has changed to New Zim Steel. This all started with 
lack of horizontal coordination. 
This chapter demonstrated that a minister and the Cabinet can have divergent views on a 
program. It demonstrated that that any decision taken by cabinet still needs the expertise and 
cooperation of a certain government department to be implemented and it the cabinet minister 
who is the political head of a major government department who as person with formal 
jurisdiction of that department is clearly the driver’s seat in relation to any policy areas under 
his jurisdiction as argued by Laver and Shepsle (1996:13). In Zimbabwe’s power sharing 
government, ZISCO failed to resume operations because the cabinet minister who controlled 
the corresponding ministerial portfolio on mineral resources was not in agreement with the 
position taken by cabinet. The ministerial jurisdiction made the Minister of Mines a veto 
player with power to block the proposals from the Ministry of Industry and Commerce 
because they differed in their preferences. The lack of coordination on ZISCO restructuring  
had detrimental effects to ZISCO workers who went for more than 38 months without 
receiving any salary, and still does so compromising their food security, access to health 
services and education for their dependents. Meanwhile a humanitarian crisis is looming after 
the Redcliff Municipality served eviction notices to the ZISCO workers as they have not paid 
rentals in five years and about 800 families will be affected ( Newsday, 05/05/2015).  
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5  Conclusion and recommendations  
5.1 Conclusion of study  
This study analyzed the challenges of coordination in Zimbabwe’s power sharing government 
between 2009 and 2013. Zimbabwe’s power sharing government was formed after President 
Mugabe resorted to systematically orchestrated violence against MDC supporters and 
officials using mainly the security forces after his electoral defeat in the first round of the 
March 2008 harmonized election.  
Coordination was defined as the management of two or more departments within the state 
where the units in question do not have hierarchical control over each other and where the 
aim is to generate outcomes that are not achievable with departments working in isolation 
with each other so that horizontal objectives are not achieved with the action of another 
department (Bakvis & Juillet, 2004:8). This thesis argued that a power sharing government 
paralyses coordination through the distribution of cabinet posts to competing political parties 
on policies that cross ministerial jurisdictions controlled by ministers from different political 
parties. Ministerial jurisdiction was defined as ministerial portfolio authority over a bundle of 
policy dimensions (Laver and Shepsle, 1996:240). 
Green Fuel is a large scale ethanol producing factory formed as a joint venture between the 
quasi-government parastatal Agricultural Research and Development Authority (ARDA) 
which is under the Ministry of Agriculture which was under a ZANU PF minister. Its main 
funder is Mr Billy Rautenbach who was put on the targeted sanctions list by the United States 
because he supports Mugabe's ZANU PF party to engage in human rights abuses via 
proceeds from his mining projects. Green Fuel aim of selling ethanol suffered a setback as the 
Minister of Energy and Power Development from MDC-T, Elton Mangoma ruled out 
mandatory blending of petrol which made Green Fuel to hold onto 10 million litres of ethanol 
primarily because the project was done without his consultation whilst the MDC was already 
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in the inclusive government and to him this was tantamount to nullifying the inclusive 
government. Minister Mangoma also argued that he could not make legislation for 
individuals since the project was for Rautenbach and the Ministry of Agriculture through 
ARDA and not with the Government of Zimbabwe.  
Minister Mangoma argued that Green Fuel was part of ZANU PF habit of running policies 
that had not been approved by cabinet of which the policy was not well thought of. More so, 
ZANU PF relationship with Rautenbach influenced its position on Green Fuel while MDC as 
victims of Rautenbach sponsored abuses influenced its position. Green Fuel was part of 
ZANU PF corruption and the largest shareholder, Rautenbach himself was not seen as purely 
Zimbabwean enough by Minister Mangoma. Moreover, the project occupied vast tracks of 
land and the land was acquired for this mega project displaced many people in an area where 
the people who have lived there had never voted for ZANU PF since independence in 1980. 
Green Fuel had its own evils as the company behaved in a criminal fashion in harassing and 
arresting villagers and the company is said to have killed cattle, slashed crops of villagers 
down which made Mangoma refuse to allow for mandatory blending of fuel.  
The restructuring of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company entailed the partial sale of the 
state owned steel company to an Indian Company Essar Africa Holdings Limited. ZISCO 
was once the largest integrated steel maker owned by the state in Sub Saharan Africa 
providing employment to more than 5000 people while 50 000 jobs were created because of 
its existence. It was a major currency earner for the independent Zimbabwe as 80% of its 
produce was mainly for export. Restructuring entailed the partial sale of its share to the 
private sector. It went through a tendering process and 54% of shares were transferred from 
the state to EAHL and it was renamed New Zim Steel at a ceremony presided over by the 
head of state with most of the executive people in government present. 
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For ZISCO to resume its operations, the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development should 
have transferred mineral rights to EAHL. While ZISCO was put on tender for nearly two 
years, the Minister of Mines Obert Mpofu from ZANU PF argued that he knew nothing about 
the ZISCO deal, was excluded from the negotiation process despite that he was the former 
Minister of Industry and Trade when the idea of restructuring was first conceived in 2006. He 
said so despite the fact that Industry and Commerce Minister Professor Ncube regularly had 
media briefings and press conferences on the progress made towards concluding the 
agreement from November 2010 until August 2011. Alternatively, Minister Mpofu should 
have told his political master from ZANU PF President Robert Mugabe who inaugurated over 
the handover ceremony that valuation of minerals was not done.  
The lack of coordination on ZISCO restructuring between these two ministries led to the 
suspension of salaries which had negative effects on the welfare of workers including the 
failure of employees to pay school fees for children, provide for their families and pay back 
borrowed loans. Some of them died because of hunger. Their welfare continues to deteriorate 
unabatedly as ZISCO is expected to resume operation in 2016. Meanwhile, the municipality 
where ZISCO is situated had collapsed because people in that municipality are ZISCO 
employees who currently do not have the money to pay for the services they receive from the 
municipality.  
 These two cases demonstrated that there were a number of governance failures that resulted 
from inadequate policy coordination and a reluctance to manage government in a more 
horizontal manner that was caused by departmentalism which emanated from the 
specialization in the development of policy proposals which gives ministers in charge of a 
certain government department jurisdiction (Laver and Shepsle, 1996:13).  It has also shown 
that the mere fact of treating Cabinet as a collection of identical partners is a futility as it 
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consists of autonomous and independent politicians, each with responsible for policy 
formulation and implementation in some particular field. It is not just a coalition of partners, 
but a distribution of specific powers over policy formulation and implementation (Laver and 
Sheplse, 1996: 282) 
 Conflict in the power sharing government was caused by “differential preferences” and 
trying to bring a certain outcome when not all cabinet ministers or departments are in 
agreement over the particular form of action taken (Dowding, 1990:50).  This study agreed 
with Laver and Shepsle (1996: 30) “public administration is complex that that any decision 
taken by cabinet needs the expertise and cooperation of a certain government department to 
be implemented and it the cabinet minister who is the political head of a major government 
department who as person with formal jurisdiction of that department is clearly the driver’s 
seat in relation to any policy areas under his jurisdiction”. Despite that Cabinet agreed on the 
partial sale of ZISCO, it still needed the expertise of the Minister of Mines whose views 
differed with that of Cabinet and embargoed the whole deal.  
Given the challenges experienced on ZISCO and Green Fuel, one may ask whether the power 
sharing government the problem or it was the policies that were defective. First, the power 
sharing was the problem as barriers to coordination emanated from the distribution of cabinet 
posts between competing political parties and each minister acted as far as possible to veto 
policies from another department that was controlled by a minister from another political 
party. It showed in a power sharing government, “power is not shared, but it is divided and 
power sharing partners exercise power differently within exclusive and competing zones of 
authority” known as jurisdictions (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011:34). Ministerial 
discretions were used vis-à-vis programs from ministers from other political parties. Had it 
been a one party cabinet system, it can be argued the issue of party discipline against 
recalcitrant and errant ministers might have been put in place. Alternatively, there was going 
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to be solidarity as the elites would have agreed of any policies put up by their political 
masters. I agree with Moyo (2011) that ZANU PF and the MDC formations are like oil and 
water who cannot mix to make a totally legal, fully representative and properly functional 
inclusive government capable of delivering goods and services to the people.  
 The inclusion of many political parties in an inclusive government did not lead to more 
moderate and nuanced policies resulting from the free flow of information and dissemination 
of ideas discouraging insular thinking and stimulating vigorous debate as argued by Halperin 
etal (2005). The power sharing government did not result in the discussion of broader range 
of options and concerns, expositing certain shortcomings and sowing of the seeds of 
solutions. The restructuring of ZISCO despite it being a team effort, cutting across, 
ministries, taking in other agencies such as government tender board and going up all the way 
up to the President was not a moderated and nuanced policy that took into consideration a 
broader range of options and concerns, and expositing certain shortcomings.  
The problem was not just power sharing, the programs themselves were defective and this 
was the main source of conflict. The agreed restructuring framework showed that the Cabinet 
was “blind, deaf, and clumsy, displayed a total dereliction of duty, showing ignorance and 
incompetence” as EAHL listed the property it has acquired for US$20 billion back in India as 
argued by Deputy Prime Minister Professor Mutambara. More so, it brings into questions the 
role of the Attorney General’s office as it was unable to see the irregularity that minerals 
resources were not valuated as part of the agreement. 
In theory, Green Fuel project was a laudable project as Zimbabwe is a landlocked country, 
exposed to fuel insecurity and volatility of oil prices and it imports all its oil needs. 
Nevertheless, it was part of ZANU habit of running with policies that have not been approved 
by Cabinet and the project is part of the patronage politics of ZANU PF with whites who 
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forged alliances with ZANU PF to protect their interests from confiscation. Green Fuel 
cannot be considered a benefit to Zimbabwe as it displaced communities, livestock was lost 
through being shot, drinking contaminated water, or by the levying of undue and oppressive 
fees for trespassing.  
 Despite these challenges of coordination experienced in Zimbabwe’s power sharing 
government, it remains credited for rescuing the economy from total collapse and the 
skyrocketing inflation of 2008 that led Zimbabwe to abandon its currency in favour of the 
United State dollar. The greatest achievement of the power sharing was that it was able to 
manage constitutional reform by coming up came up with a homegrown Constitution that 
replaced the 1979 Lancaster House constitution. The new constitution has the following 
progressive provisions presidents limited to two five-year terms even though not applied 
retrospectively; legislation can no longer be vetoed by the president; devolves power to 10 
provinces; establishes a  peace and reconciliation commission; creates independent 
prosecuting authority, anti-corruption commission, and guarantees an independent electoral 
commission, includes a progressive bill of rights which stipulates freedom of expression and 
a free media which had been challenges in the previous constitutional dispensation and 
allows dual citizenship.  
5.2 Recommendations  
It is important to note recent developments on the future state of Green Fuel as it is depended 
on the succession politics in ZANU PF. Immediately after the inclusive government, the 
ZANU PF government gave a statutory instrument for mandatory blending of fuel and the 
ZANU PF successor of Mangoma in the energy portfolio, Dzikamai Mavhaire who once said 
that “We do not have to waste time; those who want to scuttle this [Green Fuel] project 
should be beaten up, even using 'dry hands'” was later fired for aligning himself with the 
faction of the fired Deputy President Joyce Mujuru. After he was fired, the Parliamentary 
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Portfolio Committee on Youth, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment recommended to 
the National Assembly that “former Minister of Energy and Power Development, Hon 
Dzikamai Mavhaire, Macdom Investments directors and the Member of the National 
Assembly for Chipinge South Constituency, Hon Enock Porusingazi, be investigated to 
establish the truth of what transpired in relation to the development of Green Fuel” (The 
Herald, 19/02/2015). However, none of them was a government official or a member of 
parliament during the tenure of the inclusive government and the Committee 
recommendation should have pointed the role of the president office and Ministry of 
Agriculture in giving Rautenbach the authority to establish the factory on ARDA estates. 
Green Fuel may be forced to ground its operations again as the report by the Committee 
queried why Green Fuel was granted a blending licence despite it not having fulfilled the 
statutory instrument issued during Mangoma’s reign that it must become a joint venture with 
the government of Zimbabwe before any mandatory blending takes place.  
The ZISCO case highlighted that there was no inter-ministerial communication within the 
Cabinet as one ministry did not know what the other ministry was doing. Despite that major 
government projects such as the restructuring of ZISCO were a team effort, cutting across, 
ministries and going up all the way up to the President and the following institutions were 
involved; ZISCO management, Government Tender Board, Obert Mpofu (Mines Minister), 
Joel Guebuza (State Enterprise and Parastatals Minister), Attorney General’s office, 
Welshman Ncube (Industry and Commerce Minister), Prime Minister Tsvangirai (MDC-T) 
and President Robert Mugabe (ZANU PF), but the agreed  deal showed cabinet was “blind, 
deaf and dumb” as EAHL listed it acquired an asset in Zimbabwe valued at over US$20 
billion yet the negotiators agreed only US$750 million. The power sharing government 
ceased 31 July 2013, but to avoid situations like what happened on ZISCO where ministries 
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which should have appended one signature on one document sang from different hymn 
books, I recommend that  
1. The Presidents Office establish a structure like the South African Policy Coordination 
and Advisory Services (PCAS) that ensures that the Presidency is well placed 
proactively to perform its coordinating and integrating function. It must consist of 
Permanent Secretaries from clusters to ensure informed coordination of disparate 
policy areas. This organizational structure will ensure conflicts between government 
ministries were resolved, contradictions eliminated and decisions on policy proposals 
were made. 
2. Cabinet as the highest organizational structure within government with “structures 
which primarily serve to pull together and integrate central government policies, or 
act as final arbiters within the executive of conflicts between different elements of the 
government machine” (Dunleavy and Rhodes, 1990: 3) must establish co-signing 
procedures on polices that cross ministries as commonly established among German 
ministers (Hustedt & Tiessen, 2006:10). 
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